Chapter
5
Athletics
and Education
The
Union of Athletics With Educational Institutions
The yoking of athletics and education in
the United States today has become so deeply intertwined that many of us assume
that this relationship is perfectly harmonious and entirely appropriate. To
paraphrase John Stuart Mill, people tend to think of things as being entirely
natural if they have existed for a reasonably long period of time.
Intercollegiates have been around for nearly 150 years, and consequently it has
been a part of American education during our lives. Thus, for many of us
athletics seems to be a natural part of what goes on in educational
institutions. Furthermore, some of the most prominent universities in the
United States including Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Brown, Columbia, Cornell,
Duke, Rutgers, and the University of Chicago were in the vanguard of developing
and promoting intercollegiate athletic programs. This approbation by the elite
further reinforces the bond between academics and athletics giving legitimacy
to sport as an important component of American education. Yet, there have been
and continue to be critics of this marriage, with one observer expressing a
commonly perceived viewpoint:
What in the hell is a commercial entertainment
enterprise doing on a university campus. Big-time intercollegiate sport is a
business enterprise...functioning as part of a cartel, and employing athletes .
. . who are paid slave wages. (Sage, 1979, p. 189).
Nonetheless, today, as in the past, many
educational institutions are recognized for the success they have experienced
in the athletic domain. Notre Dame, Florida State, Ohio State, Stanford, and
Pennsylvania State Universities are readily associated with football, and the
University of Tennessee, Duke, North Carolina, Kansas, Stanford, and Georgetown
Universities with basketball. Yet these institutions are recognized as equally
great for their academic achievements, of which most people probably know
little. Many other schools have sought athletic success in order to produce
instant name recognition, both on the college and secondary levels.
A reasonable question to ponder though
is why athletics, philosophically thought to be a peripheral and
extracurricular activity, became such a prominent and central force in higher
education in America? Thousands of people attend games on a regular basis,
millions view them on television, and hundreds bet on their outcomes. Coaches
in high profile programs typically earn more money than University presidents,
and several times more than typical professors. Athletes are recruited with
much greater zeal than students who are acclaimed for their scholarship.
Athletic budgets are often in the millions, and are typically much larger than
for the largest academic departments. As well, stadiums and field houses with
accompanying training rooms are among the most costly facilities on campuses,
rivaling or exceeding expenditures for state of the art laboratories. Is it
possible to rationally understand how and why the athletic enterprise has
become such an integral part of an environment originally designed to promote
traditional education in the arts and sciences?
Unfortunately, there are no simple or
clear cut answers to such questions. Athletics have evolved over a long period
of time, and program development has not always followed a clear philosophical
rationale. Seemingly, a brief historical review of how athletic programs began
and were nurtured on American campuses will provide a basis for better
understanding where they stand today, and the major athletic-academic issues that
colleges and universities face. Among these are the traditional problems
regarding: (a) player recruitment, (b) the conflict of being a student and
being an athlete, (c) pressures to finance athletics at the expense of
academics, (d) athletics as a public relations tool to recruit students and win
support from financial supporters, (e) equity for women's athletic programs,
and (f) the appropriate mechanisms to develop, monitor and enforce rules.
Brief History of the Beginning of Intercollegiate
Sports
Males
According to Lucas and Smith (1978), in
1850 the importance of athletics on American campuses was of no consequence,
but by the early 1900s it had become their most important social function.
Consequently, they believe that an awareness of this period is essential for
understanding how intercollegiate athletics have come to be.Essentially, this
was a period during which the civil war occurred, industrialization of the
country was taking place, and people were moving from an agrarian society to
one which was city oriented. In fact, by 1880 the United States became the
number one industrial country in the world, having been in 7th place only a few
decades earlier. With this change people became more interdependent in their
recreational interests, and more sophisticated in building and standardizing
facilities for play and spectating. Some of the activities popular during this
period included: baseball, bicycling, bowling, boxing, cross country running,
football, golf, horseracing, pedestrianism (distance running), rowing, rugby,
skiing, soccer, squash, swimming, tennis, track and field, volleyball,
wrestling, and yachting (Betts, 1974). As well, an information and
transportation infrastructure was created which made it possible for
competitors to travel to different venues, and for results of contests to be
communicated to interested supporters (e.g., the telegraph was first used in
the 1840s and newspapers were increasingly published and read). As important
were the changes in mentality taking place in society resulting from increased
wealth that allowed a middle class of people more time for recreational
pursuits. With this also came increased organization and commercialization in
sport.
Lucas and Smith (1978) emphasize the
importance of the Civil War in the development of intercollegiate sports. They
convey that the war created a need for trained military personnel, and to
develop the means to train officers the government elected to support the
creation of colleges which would have this as one of their goals, along with
educating larger numbers of lower and middle class students. In 1862 congress
passed the Morrill Act, creating land grant colleges which were funded from the
sale of federal government lands. As expected, this provided educational
opportunities for many individuals who would not have been able to attend an
institution of higher learning. With these students came a broader range of
interests than had been typical of the elite group who had frequented colleges
in the past. As conveyed, the war also brought large numbers of young men
together who participated in and observed each others games. When the war
ended, the trend continued.
Embedded in this dynamic period was
higher education. According to Lucas and Smith (1978), mid-nineteenth century
colleges were typically church affiliated liberal arts institutions which
focused on teaching classical studies and preparing students for the ministry,
law, or the professoriat. As well, institutions were typically headed by
clergymen who enforced a rigid behavioral code which prohibited such activities
as smoking, drinking, dancing, and card playing. Absence from campus required
presidential approval and, in many institutions, compulsory chapel was an
expectation. From general accounts one can surmise that colleges were quite
paternalistic and somewhat removed from the great changes affecting the larger
society.
As might be expected, students often
rebelled against such a narrow and stifling environment. Not only did they
become involved in direct acts of insurgency such as disrupting classes,
destroying college property, and physically assaulting professors, but they
began to create an extracurriculum to provide for interests that were not being
served by the formal classical course of study. The extracurriculum included
the forming of literary and debate societies, as well as musical groups, and
college newspapers. Athletics were also included in this array of student run
and financed activities.
Interestingly, the first intercollegiate
athletic contest was partly a commercial endeavor. The Superintendent of the
Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad, interested in generating business,
offered to pay all expenses, and provide an eight day vacation for crew members
if Yale would row against Harvard on Lake Winnipesaukee in New Hampshire
(Lewis, 1967). The event took place in August and drew approximately 1000
spectators who saw Harvard defeat Yale in a race lasting about 14 minutes. In
1859, the first intercollegiate baseball game was played in Pittsfield, Massachusetts
between Amherst and Williams Colleges, while the first intercollegiate football
game was played between Princeton and Rutgers in 1869.
Lucas and Smith (1978) make the point
that in the beginning intercollegiate teams were run by student selected
captains whose role was similar to that of coach. He was responsible for
creating training rules for the team, strategizing, and selecting players to
start. Interestingly, if a team was successful, it was likely that the captain
would become the campus hero since he was viewed as responsible for the team’s
fortunes, and for bringing it distinction.
As might be expected, the popularity of
intercollegiate athletics grew at a rapid pace, and with it’s growth came
larger schedules, greater travel, longer practice hours, and the need for
uniforms and equipment. All of this, of course, required more money, which was
raised by students through what became known as the athletic association, an
organization made up of athletes and non-athletes, which supported teams
financially, and helped to take care of facilities and administer contests.
Money was also raised from fund raising drives.
Lucas and Smith (1978), make the
important point that although athletics began as a recreational diversion, it
was not long before winning became very important. They hypothesize that as in
industry where the Puritan work ethic prevailed, it filtered down to athletic
competition, with success becoming synonymous with winning. The increasing need
to win was accompanied by a host of dubious practices including: (a) using
non-students to compete, (b) recruiting students primarily for their athletic
prowess, (c) recruiting athletes from other institutions to play for another
college, (d) paying students in various ways to play (e.g., providing room and
board, providing vacations, and allowing them to sell and keep the money from
programs), (e) hiring professional coaches to replace student captains, and (f)
spying (i.e., scouting) on the opposition. A more professionalized operation
also called for purchasing better equipment, traveling first class, and having
a better training table. All of these changes increased the costs of fielding
teams, which in turn required seeking new sources of revenue. In addition to
athletic association funds, alumni were solicited for donations, and gate
receipts began to play an increasingly important role in financial viability.
As in the present day, the creation and maintenance of such programs was
costly, and income was highly dependent on winning. Consequently, winning
became increasingly important as a program moved along the path from obscurity
to prominence.
As one might surmise, a system so
predicated on winning, with little or no regulatory control from college
authorities was bound to generate problems. Primary among these was the amount
of time, travel, and energy that students devoted to sports in contrast to that
allocated to academics. As well, a general lack of financial responsibility,
often resulted in teams generating debts that they were unable to repay. Many
observers also questioned the lack of ethical and sportsmanlike behavior that
often was associated with a win at any cost mentality. Student spectators were
also often involved in betting on games, and partying to extremes at rallies supporting
their teams. Many faculty also objected to the glorification of athletic stars,
since they viewed such deification as distracting students from fully
appreciating scholars and their work.
With all the problems associated with
athletics one wonders why colleges did not simply abolish them? One argument
used against their eradication was that despite all their problems, conditions
on campus were actually better with them than without them. In contrast to the
pre-athletic era during which institutions were viewed as more repressive and
student disorders more common, the diversion of athletics had, to some extent,
distracted students from the destructive and mischievous behavior
characteristic of earlier times. The idea was that athletics provided a type of
catharsis for dissipating excessive energy. Another observation, closer to
justifying athletics as an adjunct to education, was that involvement in
vigorous competitive physical activity was important not only for health
reasons, but because it provided a medium through which men could develop
attributes such as discipline, courage, self-reliance, responsibility, and
leadership.
But, perhaps the greatest support for
athletics came from college presidents who were motivated to grow their
institutions. As pointed out by Chu (1989), the leadership of colleges during
the 1800s was changing from individuals who were clergy or professional
educators, to individuals with business acumen. These presidents were also
responsible to boards whose members were also changing and were increasingly
becoming dominated by people from the business world. As mentioned previously,
the world outside of academia was changing rapidly and many of the more
conservative and restrictive colleges had difficulty adjusting to a clientele
that wanted more than a traditional scholastic education . Consequently,
prospective students sought out what they thought to be the most progressive
and interesting institutions, leaving those failing to modernize struggling for
survival. In fact, unlike today, the need for a college education in the 19th
Century was not obvious, since upward mobility could just as easily be achieved
through apprenticeship in a trade. For many, enrolling at college was perceived
not only as a waste of time because of what was viewed as an irrelevant
curriculum, but it was also seen as a period during which potential income from
employment was lost. Thus, responding to changing market forces became
increasingly important in attracting students and maintaining financial solvency.
College presidents saw the need for
marketing their institutions and sought ways to increase their school's
viability and prestige. An interesting example of this process may be found in
the history of the University of Chicago (Lawson, & Ingham, 1980). William
Harper was given the task in 1890 of building the University to a world class
institution starting with a grant of $600,000 from John D. Rockefeller. From
1896 to 1909 enrollments increased from 1,815 to 5,500. As part of his master
plan, Harper hired Amos Alonzo Stagg, one of the most prominent football
coaches of the period, to improve Chicago's team and make the University
competitive with better known institutions. The football program and the
University prospered together during and after Harper’s presidency.
Interestingly, though, once Chicago had attained a reputation as a first rate
University, had a large student base, and the financial resources to support
its objectives, President Robert Maynard Hutchins in 1929 decided to dismantle the
football program that Stagg had built. He argued that the University was about
intellectual activity not big-time football. Of course, Hutchins had the
liberty to be more idealistic than Harper, or less well financially endowed
contemporaries, given the financial security associated with John D.
Rockefeller’s contributions of some $34.7 million dollars.
As student run programs grew in
complexity problems also continued to increase. These included, but were not
limited to students taking extended time away from campus for contests,
unsportmanlike behavior during games, recruiting irregularities, coaches who
were poor institutional representatives, financial deficits, and brutality
associated with sports like football. It was not long before institutions began
to be involved with the regulation of these student run programs. Lucas and
Smith (1978) convey that by 1900 three models of oversight existed with one
model having student, alumni and faculty representation, a second with student
and alumni representation, and a third which had a faculty board that set
policies which students were obligated to follow.
But the most profound change in
intercollegiate athletics resulted from the formation of conferences. The Big
Ten, created in 1895, is a good example of how associating with other
institutions led to the creation of more standardized regulations for the
purpose of creating a more level playing field. Conference rules prohibited the
use of non-students and coaches as players. Furthermore, participants were
required to be academically viable, and to receive no compensation for their
participation. As well, students who transferred from another institution and
wished to compete were required to sit out a half a year before they could
play. The Big Ten used a model of presidential and faculty control, which other
institutions and conferences would soon follow.
An important theme throughout these
developments was that athletics programs were clearly not viewed as an
important educational endeavor, but rather something to be tolerated, and
regulated because of their popularity and importance as a public relations
tool. Consequently, programs were required to maintain financial solvency from
fund raising, and from their commercial value. Had they been viewed as an
adjunct to an institution’s educational mission, funding would presumably have
come from a school’s operating budget. This precedent for keeping athletics
separate from other college programs may have been responsible for their
prodigious growth and increasing commercialization. As well, it may also be an
important historical element in guaranteeing sustained abuses over the years
since the necessity of generating income places a premium on winning, which, in
turn, may place extraordinary pressures on coaches to circumvent rules.
Despite the clearly extracurricular
status of athletics, there were those who believed that they did have redeeming
educational value. Chu (1988) points out that the model of English "public
schools" which incorporated sports into its curriculum, served as a model
for those who held that education required more than simply molding the mind.
As well, at the beginning of the 20th century philosophers John Dewey and
Charles Pierce were advocating the importance of yoking thought and action,
while psychologist James Watson was demonstrating the importance of the
physical environment in shaping behavior. Generalizing from these ideas some
advocates claimed that sport experiences provided a potential for students to
acquire important character attributes (Williams, 1930). The discipline,
responsibility, teamwork, mental fortitude, and assertiveness necessary for
success in sports was believed to generalize to other activities and result in
personal fulfillment and national vigor. Guttmann (1988) also makes the point
that such a view was conveyed by Theodore Roosevelt who advocated participation
in rough sports for the purpose of building manly character. Whether or not
athletic involvement actually served this purpose remains problematic. Nonetheless,
the philosophical rationale for its promotion on educational grounds by those
interested in supporting it against critics was and is quite compelling.
The Creation of the NCAA
Perhaps the culminating event in the
institutionalization of intercollegiate athletics was the creation of the NCAA.
The motivation for its inception resulted from the commercialization,
brutality, and propensity for serious injuries experienced by football players
during the period 1880 - 1905. To illustrate the rising popularity and
commercialization of the game, Lucas and Smith (1978) point out that in the
early 1880s Yale's income from football was approximately $2,800, but by the
early 1890s it had risen to over $50,000, and by 1903 it had reached $106,000.
This sum represented one-eighth of the total income of Yale University! At
Harvard, receipts for football had gone from $11,000 in the 1890s to $72,000 in
1904.
Although commercialization of football
spread across the country quickly during the late 19th century, it was the
brutality, injuries and death that ultimately led to reform and control.
According to Guttmann (1988), after an unusually violent contest between
Harvard and Yale in 1904, Harvard decided to drop football. It was at this
point that President Theodore Roosevelt, a Harvard graduate of 1880, stepped in
and convened a conference of the Presidents of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton at
the White House. His intention was to explore ways to preserve football, a game
which he personally admired because of its strenuous nature and character
building potential.
While Roosevelt brought attention to the
need for reform, it is the meeting in New York in 1905, convened by Chancellor
of New York University, Henry McCracken, which really set reform in motion.
McCracken wanted either to abolish or reform the sport, and was partially
motivated by the death of a Union College player against NYU in the last game
of the 1905 season. Presidents from thirteen colleges met in an initial meeting
(NCAAa, 1998) in early December and decided to create a new football rule's
committee, and to convene a national meeting of institutions at the end of the
month. On December 28, in New York City, the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States (IAAUS) was founded by 62 members, but it was
not until January of 1906 that recalcitrant members from the old rules
committee, led by Yale’s Walter Camp, agreed to participate in the association
(Lucas and Smith, 1978). In 1910 this group first called itself the National
Collegiate Athletic Association. The creation of the NCAA was a significant
event in the evolution of intercollegiate athletics since it not only reformed
football, but centralized sport governance, and clearly established
institutional, as opposed to student control, over athletic competition.
However, over the years, although the
intentions for athletic reform have been honorable, practices have tended to be
otherwise. With the evolution of "big time" football into a
commercial and social enterprise on campus, pressures were sufficient to prompt
coaches, and indirectly, administrators, to do what was necessary to field
winning teams. According to Rader (1983), between 1921 and 1930 attendance at
collegiate football games doubled, while gate receipts tripled. Part of the reason
for this was that the game not only attracted students and alumni but came to
transcend the institution by symbolically representing states, regions, ethnic
groups, religions, and ideologies. Stadiums were build, some with seating
capacities exceeding 70,000, publicity offices created, and schedules having
intersectional play assembled to stimulate even larger audiences. Rader (1983)
notes that in 1924 Notre Dame traveled over 10,500 miles to play prominent
teams across the country.
As in the earlier years athletes were
recruited for teams who were marginal students, and then treated more like
professionals than the amateurs which they were alleged to be. As well, large
crowds yielded large gate receipts, and the spectacle of the game and events
surrounding the game, made many wonder about whether the mission of
Universities had been diverted from teaching and scholarship to fielding
winning football teams. Perhaps, the Carnegie Foundation Report of 1929 (Savage
et al., 1929) provided the most comprehensive analysis of intercollegiate
athletics to date, examining issues raised by critics. The report identified many of the problems found
in intercollegiate sports during that period, focusing on the uneasy
relationship of having commercial and intellectual enterprises so closely
linked. Items to which the report brought attention were: (a) the recruitment
of players who were weak students, (b) the inordinate time demands placed on
training, (c) the special treatment accorded athletes, and (d) the professional
coach. The report argued that it would be impossible for institutions to
self-regulate themselves since what one school did was dependent on what others
were doing. However, it then concluded that college presidents and their
faculties should provide the necessary leadership for institutions to exhibit
self-restraint.
In the final analysis athletics’
programs developed from student interests, not educational philosophy. Although
they were problematic because of a variety of abuses including what faculty saw
as a diversion of student energy and interest away from academic pursuits, they
were too popular and important to an institutions well-being for elimination.
Indeed, athletics helped colleges to attract students, win alumni support,
captivate the surrounding community, and capture the attention and good-will of
state legislatures that funded public institutions. As well, they were seen as
a mechanism that brought increasingly fragmented campuses together. Many
traditions and rituals became associated with athletic contests including pep
rallies, college songs, marching bands, and homecoming. These all contributed
to building an "esprit de corps" among a diverse student body and
other constituencies important to an institution’s support and survival. Nonetheless,
the cost of maintaining such an enterprise on campus was having to live with a
quasi-commercial enterprise which, in many cases, emphasized
"athlete" over "student" in the "student-athlete"
equation.
Females
According to Lucas and Smith (1978), intercollegiate
competition for women was not an issue in the mid 19th century because very few
attended college. But as part of the 19th century woman’s rights movement, more
females opted for a college education by the 1870s. A prevalent belief,
however, was that women were not up to the rigors of doing college work, and
would consequently break down physically and psychologically. Consequently,
physical activity, first in the form of gymnastics program, was viewed as an
ideal way for women to build themselves up for the academic challenges that lay
ahead.
In contrast to intercollegiate sports
for men, woman's programs evolved in a carefully controlled fashion under the
guidance of female physical educators (Gerber, Felshin, Berlin, & Wyrick,
1975). The classical pyramid model shown in Figure 1, exemplifies the extent to
which forethought and organization permeated sports programs during the late
19th century and well into the 20th century. The basic philosophy was that the
most essential program was instructional which served a large number of
students who varied across a wide spectrum of skill. For those seeking lower
level competition, a program of intramurals was offered. Individuals interested
in more intense competition could become involved in intercollegiate athletics.
However, as the pyramid infers, an institution was responsible for first
developing the base. Only when it was well led and funded did the intramural
program get attention. Athletics then followed the establishment of a sound
intramural program.
Figure 1. The Pyramid Model for Woman's
Sports
As conveyed, sport, like the gymnastics
programs which proceeded it, was viewed as a means to promote health and grace,
and to strengthen students for the rigors of academic work. It was also
believed that involvement in team sports promoted important social values,
while engaging in individual sports would provide the ability to continue with
physical activity after graduation. Activities found in instructional programs
during the 19th and early 20th century included archery, basketball, crew,
cycling, fencing, field hockey, golf, horseback riding, lacrosse, rowing,
swimming, track and field, and volleyball, (Spears, 1973).
It is important to acknowledge that much
of the competition that occurred was within rather than between institutions.
Gerber et al. (1975) make the point that many writers dismiss women's sports
during this period because they were characterized by interclass, inter-dorm,
or inter-sorority competitions. As well, intercollegiates were typified by
sports days, play days, inter-class-interschool, telegraphic meets, and varsity
contests. This seemingly large array of forms, contained mostly within the
walls of institutions, under the guidance of physical educators made women's
athletics not only less of a spectacle, but less problematic than those
organized and run by male students. Clearly, the focus was on the educational,
developmental, and recreational benefits of sport than on its commercial and
public relations aspects.
The first women’s intercollegiate
competitions were in basketball, and held in 1896 between the University of
California at Berkeley and Stanford , and the University of Washington and
Ellensburg Normal School (Gerber et al., 1975). It appeared that early in the
century seasons were fairly restricted with schools which competed having less
than a10 game schedule. As well, it was not uncommon for an institution to have
an intercollegiate schedule one year and not have one the next.
Furthermore, the form of competition was
often different than that followed by men. Concern by female physical educators
for involving more students resulted in some schools following an
interclass-interschool model. Here, intramural-interclass competition would
first produce a winning team that would then go on to play against their class
counterparts at another institution. This followed the pyramid of having
intercollegiates first follow intramurals. Another variation was the
telegraphic meet. In this format standardized conditions were created on
different campuses for activities such as archery, bowling, and riflery and
results were communicated between schools via telegraph. The telegraphic meet
provided an opportunity for intercollegiate competition without the need for
being away from campus. As well, such activities were conducive to greater
numbers of students being involved.
Other variations of interschool
competition during the first half of the twentieth century were play days and
sports days. Play days involved students visiting another campus where they
would be assigned to a team with students from other schools to participate in
a series of recreational and sports activities. Sports days allowed intact
teams from a school to compete against intact teams from other institutions,
but often teams did not know ahead of time in which activities they would be
competing. As well, winning was de-emphasized, and scores were often not even
kept.
Clearly, intercollegiate athletics for
women in the late 19th Century and early part of the 20th Century had an
entirely different flavor than that found in men’s programs. In essence,
educators were in control, and wished to remain in control. Although they
believed that sport was good for women, they also believed that programs should
be available for all students, not just a few "elite" varsity
participants. As well, they believed that competition which was too intense
would produce injury to both the body and mind, thus control and moderation
were essential. The essence of this philosophy was embodied by sixteen
statements produced in 1923 at a conference devoted to athletics and physical
recreation for women and girls (Schoedler, 1924), and, with the exception of
the AAU, was endorsed by virtually all groups involved with women's sports.
While much of the philosophy upon which statements were built appears to be
consistent with earlier beliefs about the unique needs of women, much of what
was stated also seemed to be a reaction to abuses found in men’s programs. For
example, statements included: (a) protecting programs from exploitation by
spectators or gaining a commercial advantage for an institution, (b)
emphasizing sportsmanship and minimizing the need to win, (c) placing control
in the hands of properly qualified individuals, and (d) discouraging
competitions that require travel. The fear of intercollegiates for women
becoming similar to that of men's programs was further encapsulated by Mabel
Lee, first woman to become president of the American Association for Health,
Physical Education, and Recreation. She studied the issues during the 1920s and
1930s (Lee, 1931), and concluded that if intercollegiates could be conducted as
a purely amateur endeavor and not as men’s intercollegiates have been
conducted, there would be less resistance to its development by directors of
physical education. This restrictive philosophy prevailed until the 1950s and
1960s.
During the middle of the 20th
century, intercollegiate competitive programs began to increase in popularity
despite their lack of support from a more conservative leadership. According to
Gerber et al. (1975), in 1966 the Commission on Intercollegiate Sports for
Women (i.e., CIAW) was organized by the Division of Girls and Woman's Sports
(i. e., DGWS), which for the first time promoted national championships. While
somewhat of a departure from the previous philosophy of limiting competition to
more local or intramural events, the intent of providing opportunities for all
in an environment which promoted personal development rather than mass
spectacle was maintained. Championships were sponsored in golf, tennis,
gymnastics, track and field, swimming, badminton, and volleyball. The CIAW was
replaced by the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women in 1972 (i.
e., AIAW), which became not only the organizer of national championships, but a
governing body which had the power to set rules, and punish violations.
However, by 1980, the NCAA had taken over women's intercollegiates, and shortly
thereafter, the AIAW ceased to exist. Today, women's and men's programs have
become indistinguishable with regard to their philosophies, organization and
administration.
Athletic
Issues
In examining whether or not
intercollegiate athletics, on balance has had a positive or negative impact on
institutions of higher learning, one must first acknowledge that athletic
programs, like the schools they represent, vary greatly. Some programs are
small, participant focused, receive little media exposure and generate no
income, while others appear to be large commercial endeavors with professional
facilities, national media coverage, and operating budgets in the millions.
Because of the diversity in philosophy and associated program implementation,
three competitive divisions have been established by the NCAA. These are
primarily determined by the number of teams an institution must sponsor,
playing schedule requirements, minimum spectator attendance at football games,
and whether athletic scholarships are awarded.
In Division I institutions are required
to have seven teams for men and seven for women (or six for men and eighth for
women). As well, there must be two team sports for each gender, and each gender
must have a team in each of the three season (i. e., Fall, Winter, Spring).
Excluding basketball and football, teams must play 100% of their minimum number
of games against Division 1 opponents, and 50% of games above the minimum
number must be played against Division 1 teams. Men’s and women’s basketball
teams must play all but two of their contests against Division 1 opponents, and
men must play at least one third of their games in their home arena. In
Division 1, football is further sectioned into 1-A and 1-AA. Division 1-A
schools must play at least 60% of their games against 1-A opponents, and
demonstrate their ability to attract a high level of spectatorship.The following criteria
must be met for Division 1-A status:
- The institution shall have averaged more
than 17,000 in paid attendance per home game in the immediate past
four-year period, or
- The stadium utilized regularly for the
institution's home games during the football seasons being evaluated shall
contain a minimum of 30,000 permanent seats. Further the institution shall
have averaged more than 17,00 in paid attendance per home football game
for games played in that stadium at least one year during the immediate
past four-year period, or
- Be in a conference in which at least six
conference members sponsor football and more than half of football schools
meet the attendance criterion" (NCAA, 1998).
To be classified in Division 1-AA in
football schools need to play more than 50% of their games against I-A or I-AA
opponents, but do not need to meet attendance requirements (NCAA, 1998).
In Division II, schools need only
sponsor four sports for men and a minimum of four sports for women, and have at
least two team sports for each gender. In addition, there must be a team for
each gender in each of the three seasons (NCAA, 1998a). Furthermore, men’s and
women’s basketball teams must play at least 50% of their games against Division
II or Division I opponents. Men’s football teams can include Division 1-A and
1-AA opponents in their 50% count. In basketball, 50% of games must also be
against Division II or I opponents. There are no scheduling requirements for
teams other than football and basketball. As well there are no attendance
requirements for football or arena game requirements for basketball.
Both Divisions I and II may offer
athletic scholarships ( also known as counters or head counts) which can
include tuition, fees, room, board, and books. However, a difference exists
between divisions in the number of awards that may be granted in a sport.
Division 1 is permitted more scholarships in basketball, and significantly more
in football. For example, Division 1-A football is permitted 85 scholarships,
while Division II football may allocate only 36 scholarships. In Division I
basketball , men are allotted 13 scholarships and women 15. In Division II
basketball, men and women are each permitted 10 scholarships. In general,
Division I is also permitted more scholarship awards than Division II across
remaining sports (NCAA, 1998; 1998a). Consequently, Division I programs are
clearly permitted to spend more (i. e., minimum of 50% of maximum allowable in
each sport) to attract a greater number of highly skilled athletes than
Division II counterparts (i.e., no requirement for financial aid). As well,
football and basketball are set-off in Division 1 from other sports by allowing
them to have a higher percentage of scholarship athletes.
Division III, like Division II, must
offer at least four sports for men and four for women. In addition, each gender
must have two team sports, with at least one sport for each sex in each of the
three seasons. An additional requirement is that football and men’s basketball
teams must play at least 50% of their games against NCAA Division III members,
or institutions that do not grant athletics scholarships. There are no
scheduling requirements for other sports other than playing a minimum number of
contests. In Division III, athletes may receive financial aid based on need and
academic prowess (NCAA, 1998h).
Examining philosophies across divisions
(NCAA Manual, 1998), all either state explicitly, or infer implicitly, that
academic excellence and opportunity is a primary objective for individuals
participating in intercollegiates. Division I then mentions that member schools
strive for regional and national prominence in athletics, and in so doing,
attempt to serve participants, the student body, faculty-staff, and alumni.
Additionally, Division I acknowledges the importance of its programs to the
community, area, state and nation. Division I also states that their athletics
programs attempt to be self-supporting by producing income, presumably from
football and basketball, that can then support the entire athletics program.
The Division II philosophy mirrors that
of Division I, except that the scope of its aspirations seem to be a bit
smaller. Division II also recognizes the importance of its programs to the
campus community, but appears to limit its general public appeal to the state
level. Division II also notes that it believes in the principle of athletic
scholarship, but on a more modest level than Division I.
Division III philosophy is clearly
different from those of Divisions I and II. It places emphasis on the
importance of athletics as an educational medium for participants, and
explicitly devalues its importance as entertainment for others, although it
does recognize that it may be of interest to students, alumni, and
institutional personnel. As well, regional competition and conference
championships are primarily emphasized, although national championships are
also a goal. The philosophy further states that athletes should be treated no
differently than other students, and consequently no athletic scholarships are
permitted. Finally, Division III proposes that athletics programs, as an
educational endeavor, should be financed along with other academic programs
through an institution’s general operating budget.
Clearly, intercollegiate athletics is
not one thing, but a mixture of different philosophies and practices. Probably,
little would be said about it if all institutions ascribed to the Division III
philosophy, since there would be little need for high pressure recruiting,
keeping players eligible, winning, media attention, bowl games, final fours and
producing a large amount of revenue to cover extensive expenditures. In
contrast to the hoopla and mass hysteria characterizing Division I programs,
Division III, which actually comprises most NCAA schools (DI = 32%, DII = 27%,
D3= 41%, NCAA, 1998c), is viewed as somewhat of an anomaly (e.g., see Looney,
1994). Indeed, the historical thread which joins the birth of men’s intercollegiates
with its present day form is found predominantly in Division I, and to a lesser
extent in Division II. Philosophically, and operationally, programs have not,
and are not, just about the participants, and their educational development. As
clearly stated, programs strive to attain national recognition, and in so
doing, generate enough income to support their large budgets. On the other
hand, Division III philosophy comes closest historically to the development of
women’s sports. Clearly, such programs had a strong educational philosophy
which promoted an exclusive focus on participants, with no responsibility or
interest in providing entertainment for spectators or generating income.
Educational Benefits of Participating
in Athletics
Since all three divisions claim, in one
way or another, that education is a primary rationale for their existence one
would seemingly be curious to determine how well this objective is actually
being met. Of course, this is not an easy thing to assess since education can
mean any one of a number of things. It could mean the acquisition of knowledge
and skills that a participant gets directly about a sport. It could mean the
types of things athletes learn from participation that can be allegedly
transferred to other activities such as discipline, perseverance, anxiety
management, setting and fulfilling goals, and being a team player. Or it could
mean that sport prowess provides opportunities for individuals to attend
institutions of higher learning, and in so doing, gain access to academic
programs that provide not only a basic liberal education, but a foundation for
future employment. The educational objective could also mean all of these
things.
From a simple observational point of
view there is probably little debate that involvement in an athletics’ program
helps develop specific sport skills and knowledge. While there are a plethora
of studies which empirically assess the degree to which students acquire sport
skills while numerous variables are manipulated (e.g., see Magill, 1993 ),
there is only anecdotal evidence from athletes and writers about how
involvement in a particular program led to a participant’s athletic
development. Perhaps the most interesting approach for conveying the idea that
coaches can be great teachers of their sport comes from Walton (1992) who
reviewed the teaching methods and programs of six individuals he selected as
great coaches. Included in his analysis were Vince Lombardi, Woody Hayes, John
Wooden, James Counsilman, Brutus Hamilton, and Percy Cerutty. Besides their
prodigal achievements in terms of winning, they all had a genius for attracting
talent and developing athletes and teams that excelled in the competitive
domain. While Walton observed many common characteristics running across these
individuals that transcended the immediate sport context, he found all to be
great teachers of their sports. They were experts on techniques and strategies,
innovative in creating or adapting to new practices, and able to convey
information effectively. More recently, Smith (1998) has produced a similar
analysis of basketball coach Pat Summitt, and the impact she has on teaching
her recruits how to play basketball and win championships. Seemingly, the list
of coaches who teach their sport well is long. Not all are nationally
prominent. Nonetheless, there is probably little argument that students who
participate in intercollegiates learn skills and acquire a significant amount
of sport spicific knowledge. Consequently, an issue that might be broached concerns
whether such sport’s specific learning alone justifies the existence of
intercollegiates on educational grounds? I would think that most people would
be hard pressed to make a convincing case that it does.
A second related issue is whether involvement
in athletics helps participants develop a variety of positive character
attributes. This idea has been around for a long time and goes back at least to
ancient Greece and the belief that health and well-being was a function of both
a sound mind and a sound body (i. e., mens sana in corpore sano). The idea was
also found in the 1800s in England where the concept of "muscular
Christianity" became a powerful force affecting educational philosophy and
practice in "public schools". The basic notion was that physical
strength and vigor went hand and hand with moral and spiritual strength. Thus,
being a good Christian required individuals to develop themselves physically.
According to Redmond (1978) team games such as cricket and football were
especially popular during this period since it was believed that besides
developing moral character, involvement also fostered loyalty and patriotism,
which transferred in later life to the military. Perhaps this was the basis for
French Parliamentarian Count de Montalembert, on visiting Eton in 1855 saying,
that the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton (Underwood,
1981).
In the United States sport also received
a strong endorsement from the changing philosophical climate of the19th century
(Mechikoff & Estes, 1998). In contrast to mind-body separation advocates
such as Decartes, transcendentalists such as Emerson and Thoreau believed that
mind and body were a unity, that action was more important than contemplation,
and that rugged individualism was something to be desired. Pragmatists such as
Peirce and James further argued for mind-body unity, and the importance of
experience in creating knowledge and shaping one’s behavior. According to
Mechikoff and Estes (1998), Darwin’s work also had a profound effect on the
idea that the physical and social environment had a powerful impact on our
well-being, and that competition was an essential part of our biological and
social survival. Adelman (1986) further makes the interesting point that during
the middle of the 19th Century, as families moved to the cities and fathers
took on factory and office jobs, they feared that their sons would become
feminized by their wives who were at home. Consequently, the physicality of
sport involvement was seen as a substitute for physical work that their sons
would have done on the farms from which they had emigrated.
Embedded in this changing philosophical
and social landscape during the late 19th Century and early 20th Century was
the need for college administrators to justify intercollegiates as a legitimate
part of an institutions educational mission. Seemingly, it could be argued that
sport provided a medium through which students might acquire generic attributes
such as discipline, co-operativeness, competitiveness, tolerance, perseverance
and a host of other qualities that would supplement the knowledge and skills
acquired in more conventional academic areas. Indeed, many prominent
individuals have commented on the hypothesized relationship between sport
involvement and the acquisition of important personal attributes. General
Douglas MacArthur (1971) claimed that "Sport is a vital character
builder" that teaches youth to be strong, brave, courageous, and to learn
how to deal with both victory and defeat. He believed that "the seeds of
victory in World War I were sown on the fields of friendly strife"
(Underwood, 1981). Sociologist,
David Riesman alluded to the importance of athletic
experience in building positive personality attributes when he said, "The
path to the boardroom leads through the locker room" (Underwood, 1981). Famed pediatrician Benjamin Spock, a member of
the gold medal Olympic crew of 1924, similarly believed in the virtue of sport
as an important element in his education and future success when he stated
"Crew made me" (Underwood,
1981). Former President Gerald Ford also wrote about the importance of athletic
competition and winning in building character (Ford, 1974).
Notwithstanding such personal beliefs,
it is not irrefutable that involvement in intercollegiate sports has the
categorically positive effect to which so many have attested. Gilbert (1988),
perhaps, conveyed a more balanced perspective in stating:
Unlike, say, strychnine or tight shoes, the
effects of sporting competition are not automatic and universal. Like eating,
work or sex, competition can be constructive or corruptive depending on
circumstances, individuals and how they behave themselves (p. 92).
Certainly, Robert Hutchins, former
president of the University of Chicago, in convincing his board of trustees to
abolish its football team in 1938 did not view football as contributing to the
development of character (Lawson & Ingham, 1980). Seemingly, the belief in
character development through sport is a mixed bag (Hodge, 1989). Today, those
who study the issue from a more scientific perspective believe that the quality
of experience determines whether people grow in a positive direction, or
develop less desirable attributes. For example, it has been shown in youth
sports that coaches who are trained to be good teachers, supportive of their
athletes, and provide positive role models are better able to develop in their
players the sorts of traits associated with character development (Smith &
Smoll, 1997).
On the other hand, many have wondered
about how the professional model of athletics, and the winning at any cost
mentality has affected players from the highest levels down through youth
sports. From the same social learning perspective (Bandura, 1977), it can be
reasoned that models which display antisocial behavior, reinforce
unsportsmanlike actions, and promote the notion that winning at any cost is the
only dimension worth pursuing will produce less desirable traits in athletes.
While no systematic studies exist which attempt to determine the effects of
negative coaching behaviors, or a negative environment on the characterological
development of athletes, some circumstantial evidence suggests that continued
involvement in sport does not necessarily lead to the development of more mature
moral reasoning. In fact, Bredemeier and Shields (1986) found that although
high school basketball players and nonathletes were not different in their
responses to two hypothetical moral dilemmas set in everyday life and two
sport-specific situations, college non-athletes were superior in moral
reasoning across both situations. When 20 college swimmers were added to the
sample, it was found that they fell between non-athletes and basketball players
on moral reasoning situations, although significant differences only occurred
between swimmers and basketball players. Bredemeier and Shields (1993)
concluded that such findings suggest that it is not experience in a sport which
is associated with less mature moral reasoning, since swimmers were higher than
basketball players even though they had about the same experience, but possibly
"...the amount of physical contact, the length of involvement, the
competitive level, or the type of interpersonal interaction in one’s sport
experience" (p. 593). As well, they suggest that an alternative
interpretation may be that persons with more mature moral reasoning may be less
interested in, or are selected out of certain collegiate athletic programs. An
earlier study by Ogilvie, & Tutko (1971) supported such a Social Darwinian
notion in concluding that for a variety of personality traits a model which
showed a filtering out, rather than a development of attributes was more
tenable in identifying athletes at higher competitive levels.
Certainly, the argument can and has been
made that advanced levels of participation requires a conformity to obeying
rules set forth by those in charge. While learning to follow rules may serve an
important social function, it may also stifle the development of character and
moral development because it can lead to conforming to practices and behavior
without thinking, or without developing the courage to not conform when such
behavior would be more appropriate from an ethical viewpoint. In contrast to a
model of sport in which coaches control most aspects, Crossley (1988) has
argued for a model in which activities are actually less organized.
Accordingly, this would provide a greater experiential framework around which
participants themselves would learn to resolve controversies, and adjudicate differences.
In the end, the argument justifying the inclusion of athletics in higher
education as a means to develop character is ambiguous at best. Perhaps,
Docheff (1998) puts it best in stating:
...character development can be positive or
negative. The outcome of character development is determined by a number of
factors-that is, the character of those that support and drive the endeavor,
including coaches, teachers, administrators, parents, boosters clubs, and the
student body (p. 24).
A third justification for the inclusion
of athletics programs in higher education is that involvement, in some way,
actually can contribute to a participants academic standing (Chu, 1989). Such a
rationale is somewhat surprising in light of arguments to the contrary made by faculty
and administrators throughout the years that athletics distracts students from
their academic work. Indeed, in 1929 the Carnegie Foundation concluded the
following:
The common notion that athletes in general are
poorer students than non-athletes is erroneous. On the other hand,
participation in sports that require very hard training and long practice hours
impairs the academic standing of certain athletes.... The causes of this
condition are ascribable not to inferior mental equipment among college athletes...but
to the conduct, emphasis, and values of modern college sport.
Edwards (1986) further makes the point
that for athletes in big time football and basketball programs the time
commitment to their sport severely limits the effort they can make to their
academic programs. Underwood (1980) estimated that football players at major
Division I schools put in between forty-five and forty-nine hours a week during
the season when preparation, participation and recovery are considered.
Including travel time to the mix increases the estimate to about sixty hours a
week. He estimated that basketball players t put in between thirty-five and
forty hours a week, and with travel time fifty-hours was a reasonable
approximation. Davies (1994) further points out that if an athlete is taking 15
credits a semester and putting in the typical two hours of study for each hour
of class attended, this would mean that athletes must put in work weeks that
exceed seventy hours! Obviously, this is not an optimal situation for a student
attempting to earn a degree.
More recently the NCAA has attempted to
limit such inordinate athletic time commitments by limiting practice time to 4
hours a day and 20 hours a week. But considerable "wiggle room" still
exists. For example, all competition and any associated athletically related
activities on the day of competition counts as three hours regardless of the
actual duration of activities. Travel to and from practices and competitions
are also not included in the tally. Furthermore, individualized conditioning
sessions that are not "required" or supervised by athletic staff are
not counted (NCAA Manual, 1998).
Consequently, one really must wonder
about the basis of any argument which suggests that involvement in athletics
enhances academic performance? Seemingly, the variety of athletic programs in
which individuals engage, and the assortment of measures of academic
achievement used to assess academic development are sufficiently large to make
any type of generalization highly tentative. Involvement in intercollegiates
can range from the more pristine forms that are found in Division III (e. g.,
Looney, 1994; Underwood, 1975) schools such as MIT and Amherst, to the more
professionalized programs that are typified by such institutions as Florida
State and the University of Nebraska. As well, there are also the "revenue
producing" sports of football and basketball and the larger cluster of low
profile sports such as tennis, field hockey, and swimming. Further,
institutions themselves vary in academic reputation with the Ivy League and its
cohorts on one end of the continuum, and a larger number of less prestigious
institutions on the other end. Institutional and sport variability make
comparisons of athletes and non-athletes problematic since being a football
player at Ohio State is much different than being a volleyball player at
Swarthmore. While both individuals are classified as "athlete", and
both individuals may have a tremendous drive to be successful in their sport,
it is more than likely that the expectations and demands for the two concerning
training, travel, and other sport’s related activities are entirely different.
Certainly, there is little comparison between the two in terms of exposure to
large crowds, appearances on national television, and coverage in the media.
Consequently, when Amherst President Tom Gerety speaks about sports as being
"The sweatiest of the liberal arts" (Looney, 1994, p.77), he is
talking about a totally different enterprise than what goes on in the Rose Bowl
or Final Four. From a research point of view studies which have arbitrarily
contrasted a group of athletes and non-athletes on a variety of academic
measures with the intent of generalizing across all athletes and non-athletes
has little meaning (for a review of such studies see Chu, 1989, pps. 69-73).
Furthermore, in assessing academic
performance there are also a number of confounding issues. GPA would seemingly
be a standardized measure that could be used to compare how athletes fare in
contrast to their non-athletic cohorts, but GPA does not fairly capture course
difficulty which typically ranges from the more challenging mathematical and
scientific disciplines to the less technical, and typically more popular,
"gut" courses and majors. To give meaning to such contrasts one would
need to show that athletes and non-athletes are distributed across majors and
courses in a similar fashion. While there are no wide scale studies that have
examined this issue, it is more than likely that athletes in "big
time" programs are not majoring in physics, chemistry, mathematics, and
electrical engineering to the same degree as their non-athletic peers.
Consequently, when one looks at contrasts of GPAs between athletes and
non-athletes at Division I Schools, such as was done by the American Institute
for Research (1988), and finds that athletes in revenue producing sports have
lower GPAs (2.46) than athletes in other sports (2.61), or students involved
with other types of extracurricular activities (2.79), one wonders what this
actually means? The report also found that athletes had more psychological,
physical, and alcohol and drug related problems than other students in time
demanding extracurricular activities. Seemingly, in this study it does not
appear that athletic involvement enhances academic performance, as was
initially proposed. Indeed, the contrary may be true. Furthermore, given the
likelihood that athletes are disproportionately represented in easier courses
and majors, the argument could be made that athletic involvement actually
depresses academic performance.
In the same study (American Institute
for Research,1988), a factor which makes interpretation even more difficult is
that athletes in revenue producing sports also were admitted to colleges with
an average SAT of 883, which was slightly lower than athletes in other sports
(919), and some 107 points lower than a non-athletic group (990). SAT is a
predictor of subsequent academic performance, thus, one would predict from
these SATs, everything else being equal, that the reported GPAs would be in the
order reported. Thus, the depressing effect of athletics, previously alluded
to, might actually be incorrect. It is entirely possible that athletic
involvement has no affect on GPA, and that students performed academically, as
expected, based on prior academic achievement.
Perhaps, if one wishes to make the case
that sport involvement enhances academic achievement, the most compelling
argument would be that talented high school athletes wish to continue to compete
in organized sport after graduation, and unless they are talented enough to
jump to the pros, their most likely option is playing in college. Consequently,
the argument may be made that involvement in formal athletics’ programs
provides motivation and a path to higher levels of education. Not only may
athletes be motivated to play out their careers through the educational
hierarchy, but colleges are more than willing to accept talented athletes who
meet only minimal academic criteria. Consequently, exposure to at least some
college is more than likely for those who wish to play their sport for as long
as possible. Ultimately, this has the serendipitous benefit of at least
exposing such individuals to higher levels of education.
This general hypothesis has a basis in a
number of interesting observations made by Philips and Schafer (1971). They
point out that several studies have concluded that athletes aspire to attend
college to a greater degree than non-athletes, and that this effect is
particularly marked for individuals lower in IQ and socio-economic status. Some
of the reasons they proposed for this generic finding include: (a) athletes are
more encouraged by coaches, teachers and counselors to attend college, (b)
athletes are more likely to be members of the "leading crowd" who
aspire to be college bound and upwardly mobile, (c) school policies often
require students to meet specified academic standards before being allowed to
participate, (d) athletes must be willing to conform to behavioral standards that
keep them out of trouble, and (e) higher peer status may enhance an athlete’s
self-esteem which transfers to greater motivation for succeeding academically.
Spreitzer and Pugh (1973) further confirmed the relationship between athletic
involvement and educational aspirations, but found that the "value
climate" of a school determined the potency of the relationship. This was
assessed by whether athletic or academic achievement was more highly valued.
For schools in which athletics were valued more highly than academics, athletes
had higher status among their peers, and consequently the argument was made
that such individuals would normally wish to continue to receive recognition
through college attendance. In contrast, the relationship between athletic involvement
and educational aspirations was negligible in schools in which athletics were
not held in high regard. From these studies it is evident that athletic
involvement and educational aspirations are intertwined in a complex fashion.
However, it does appear that when athletics involvement is a means for gaining
social status, a variety of environmental contingencies reinforce athletes to
seek upward mobility through present and future educational opportunities.
As an addendum to the notion that
participation in athletics, in some manner, fosters academic achievement are
the NCAA’s academic requirements for incoming college students. It sets a
minimum standard that must be met in order for an individual in Division I and
Division II to qualify for athletic scholarships, practice and compete (NCAA,
1998). In contrast to earlier times when too many individuals were accepted by
colleges because of their athletic prowess, and were not adequately prepared or
interested in doing college work the recent inclusion of standards guarantees
at least minimal academic competencies. This has had the effect of sending a
message to high school prospects that if they do not take academics seriously
and prepare themselves for the rigors of college work, despite their athletic
talent, they will not be eligible to receive an athletic scholarship, practice,
or compete. Consequently, there is now a structural link between athletic
involvement and motivation to achieve academically in high school.
Besides being a high school graduate,
individuals must meet the following standards in Division I: Successfully
complete a core curriculum of at least 14 academic courses including at least
four years in English, two in math, one year of algebra and one year of
geometry (or one year of a higher-level math course for which geometry is a
prerequisite), two in social science, two in natural or physical science
(including at least one laboratory class, if offered); one additional course in
English, math or natural or physical science; and two additional academic
courses (which may be taken from the already-mentioned categories, e.g.,
foreign language, computer science, philosophy or non-doctrinal religion; See NCAA PowerPoint on Eligibility, 2003).
1. Have a grade-point average (based on
a maximum of 4.000) and a combined score on the SAT verbal and math sections or
a sum score on the ACT based on the following qualifier index scale.
Qualifier Index
|
Qualifier Index: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Core GPA |
ACT |
SAT (old |
SAT (new |
|
|
(new: sum |
scoring |
scoring |
|
|
scoring) |
before |
after |
|
|
|
4/1/95) |
4/1/95) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.500 & above |
68 |
700 |
820 |
|
2.475 |
69 |
710 |
830 |
|
2.45 |
70 |
720 |
840-850 |
|
2.425 |
70 |
730 |
860 |
|
2.4 |
71 |
740 |
860 |
|
2.375 |
72 |
750 |
870 |
|
2.35 |
73 |
760 |
880 |
|
2.325 |
74 |
770 |
890 |
|
2.3 |
75 |
780 |
900 |
|
2.275 |
76 |
790 |
910 |
|
2.25 |
77 |
800 |
920 |
|
2.225 |
78 |
810 |
930 |
|
2.2 |
79 |
820 |
940 |
|
2.175 |
80 |
830 |
950 |
|
2.15 |
80 |
840 |
960 |
|
2.125 |
81 |
850 |
960 |
|
2.1 |
82 |
860 |
970 |
|
2.075 |
83 |
870 |
980 |
|
2.05 |
84 |
880 |
990 |
In recognition that some individuals do
not do well on standardized tests, but yet may be viable students, the NCAA has
established the classification known as "Partial Qualifier." This
means that an individual who does not meet the previous standards, but does
meet those presented below, may practice with a team at its home facility and receive
an athletics scholarship during his or her first year, and then still have
three seasons of eligibility left. As well, as an inducement to focus on
academics, a partial qualifier may earn a fourth year of eligibility if he or
she receives a baccalaureate degree prior to the fifth year of full-time
enrollment.
Partial Qualifier Index:
________________________________________________________
|
Core GPA |
ACT |
SAT (old |
SAT (new |
|
|
(new: sum |
scoring |
scoring |
|
|
scoring) |
before |
after |
|
|
|
4/1/95) |
4/1/95) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2.750 & above |
59 |
600 |
720 |
|
2.725 |
59 |
610 |
730 |
|
2.7 |
60 |
620 |
730 |
|
2.675 |
61 |
630 |
740-750 |
|
2.65 |
62 |
640 |
760 |
|
2.625 |
63 |
650 |
770 |
|
2.6 |
64 |
660 |
780 |
|
2.575 |
65 |
670 |
790 |
|
2.55 |
66 |
680 |
800 |
|
2.525 |
67 |
690 |
810 |
Division II also has academic criteria
which students must meet, but they are somewhat simpler. As in Division I an
athlete must have graduated from high school with a GPA of at least 2.0 and
have completed a core of 13 courses including: three years in English, two in
math, two in social science, two in natural or physical science (including at
least one laboratory class, if offered by your high school) and two additional
courses in English, math or natural or physical science; and two additional
academic courses (which may be taken from the already-mentioned categories,
e.g., foreign language, computer science, philosophy or non-doctrinal
religion). In addition, individuals must have a combined score on the SAT of
700 if taken before April 1, 1995, or 820 if taken on or after April 1, 1995,
or a 68 sum score on the ACT.
A partial qualifier in Division II is
someone who has met only the GPA or SAT requirements, and is allowed to
practice with a team at its home facility and receive an athletics scholarship
during his or her first year. The individual then, if successful academically,
has four seasons of competition remaining.
It is evident from these minimal
academic criteria that the NCAA is attempting to do a better job of ensuring
the student portion of the student-athlete equation. Although setting of these
minimal academic standards seems relatively innocuous to most college
constituencies since they are quite minimal, they have not been instituted
without controversy. Some have argued that standardized tests discriminate
unfairly on racial and cultural grounds. Recent data does show that
considerable variability exists among groups with Asians and Whites scoring, on
average, 21.8 and 21.7 on the ACTS and Mexican- Americans and Blacks scoring,
on average, 18.5 and 17.1 (Chronicle of Higher Education, 1998a). For the SATs
similar differences exist, with Whites and Asians scoring on average, 526 and
496, and Mexican Americans and Blacks scoring on average 451 and 434 (Chronicle
of Higher Education, 1998b). While standardized test criteria are considered
quite minimal, average differences between Whites and Blacks are approximately
11% in favor of Whites, and the majority of non-qualifiers and partial qualifiers
have been Black.
While these differences are charged with
racial overtones, the NCAA acknowledges that their own estimates predicted a
decrease in college enrollments by Black athletes after Proposition 48 went
into effect, with a return to pre-Proposition 48 levels by the mid-1990s (NCAA,
1998f). NCAA data shows that Black athletes represented 27.3% of
student-athletes in 1985, the year prior to Proposition 48, and dropped to
23.6% the following year. But by 1989 the percentage had increased to 25%. The
NCAA also reports that it did not see effects on enrollments by other groups as
a result of Proposition 48, although Hispanic athletes had an initial decline,
but returned quickly to prior levels and then surpassed those. However, they
also predicted that with Proposition 48 graduation rates of Black athletes
would rise. They substantiate this assertion by showing that in 1985, 1337
Black athletes graduated, but with 3.7% fewer Black athletes in 1989, 1613
graduated. These data seem to suggest that students who are better prepared for
college have a better chance of graduating, and that high school students who
wish to be college athletes will make a greater effort to achieve academically
(e. g. see Suggs, 1999). Of course, there are alternative interpretations to the NCAA’s
explanations for what is happening. For one, athletic departments have become
more graduation conscious and have put in place more academic support services
for student-athletes.
A second observation concerns the
creation of what appears to be a "cottage industry" for cheating on
ACTs and SATs in order to meet standards. Yaeger, and
Wolff (1997) report
on a number of cases in which prospective student-athletes did something illegal,
or were in situations that looked suspicious, in order to meet NCAA
standardized test criteria. Reported anecdotes ranged from copying from someone taking SATs sitting adjacent to the
prospective college athlete, to having a substitute take the test. They also
report on proctors changing answers. Seemingly, there is great pressure on
athletics’ programs to recruit talent, some of which might now opt to go
directly from high school to the pros because college becomes no longer an
option when test scores are too low. As well, there may be a perception that
agents from other programs may be making deals with athletes who know that
their only hope of meeting academic standards is to do something unethical.
Consequently, there are people who can be contacted to arrange to have recruits
pass. Athletes also feel pressure to go along. Yaeger and Wolff quote three
time Parade All-American basketball player, Terrance Roberson who had to sit
out his freshman year at Fresno State for having his ACTs questioned,
"You're thinking, If I don't pass this test,
I might not be in school. I might still be around my neighborhood. You're going
to do whatever it takes. In this world, if you ain't got caught, you ain't
cheating."
Despite Yaeger and Wolff’s report, it is
unclear to what extent cheating occurs. Nonetheless, it is evident that, at
least to some degree, colleges and athletes have attempted to beat the system.
A final issue that requires attention
when discussing the impact of athletic involvement on academic achievement
concerns graduation rates. As previously mentioned this measure is fraught with
problems as an index of achievement since it is not entirely clear what a
degree truly represents. Nonetheless, graduation rates have become a regularly
monitored statistic to at least assess whether athletes are receiving degrees,
or simply playing out their eligibility and leaving school with little more
than they had upon entering college. Despite difficulty in interpreting the
meaning of graduation rates, publication of this information (NCAA, 1998e) has
put pressure on coaches and schools to provide services to athletes that will
help them to obtain degrees. It is not uncommon today for large athletic
programs to provide tutors, require study halls, have computer centers, and
monitor an athlete’s academic progress. Seemingly, the reputation of a program,
a coach, and an institution depends on athletes getting degrees. Reports of
graduation rates of athletics programs are sent each year from the NCAA to
27,000 high schools for use by guidance counselors, coaches, students, and
parents so that "athletics factories" can be separated from
institutions where athletes get degrees in reasonable numbers. As well,
collated data is published each year in a variety of media including the
Chronicle of Higher Education. The following figures (Figure 1) show graduation
rates for athletes and non-athletes at Division I school from 1984 through
1990. These figures, as is conventional, give percentages of athletes who
enrolled as freshman, received athletics related financial aid, and who
graduated within a six year period from the time of their initial enrollment.
The NCAA claims that the data are conservative because athletes who transfer to
another institution and graduate elsewhere are counted against the original
institution as not having graduated, and are not counted as having graduated
from the second college.
Figure 1. Graduation rates for male and
female athletes
As seen in Figure 1 females tend to
graduate at a higher percentage than males (on average 57.0% vs. 53.6%), while
female athletes graduate at a significantly higher rate than their male
counterparts (on average 66.0% vs. 51.3%). Furthermore, female athletes tend to
graduate at a significantly higher rate than females in general (66.0% vs.
57%), while male athletes graduate at a slightly lower rate than males in
general (on average 51.3% vs. 53.6%). Interestingly, the largest increase in
graduation rates for athletes occurred in 1986, which was the first year that
the NCAA invoked high school graduation standards for incoming freshmen
athletes (i. e., Proposition 48).
From these data two points seem
apparent. First, the introduction of academic criteria for incoming students in
1986 seemed to have had a positive effect on the graduation rates of both male
and female athletes. The reason for this increment is not known, but could
simply be a function of eliminating high school athletes who stood little
chance of succeeding academically. Consequently, individuals with high school
diplomas, but with marginal GPAs and poor SATs or ACTs, that may have been
admitted in previous years by "athletic factories" were structurally
removed from eligibility. If this was the case, the incoming classes from 1986
on would have higher academic potential than previous classes, and would thus
be expected to have a higher rate of success. As well, it is also possible that
the setting of standards and the publication of graduation rates changed the
mindset of athletes and coaches who were not heretofore seriously committed to
academics. The message was clearly that if an athlete could not cut it
academically he or she would never even get an opportunity to play.
A second point that is derived from
these data is the large difference in graduation rates between males and
females. Across the six year period, female athletes not only exceed the
graduation rates of females in general, but exceed the graduation rates of
males, and male athletes by more than 10%! Why females in general have an
advantage over males in graduation rate is not clear, nor is it evident why
female athletes have such an overwhelming advantage over male athletes. One
might speculate that the gap is a result of lower graduation rates from
involvement in "revenue producing sports" such as football and
basketball which often require a greater commitment, and, thus, greater
conflict with academics than other programs. However, Figure 2 shows that the
depressing effect of these sports seems to be more a function of the graduation
rates of basketball players than of football players, who tend to approximate
or exceed the graduation rates of male athletes in general. For females,
basketball players also tend to under-perform other athletes in graduation
rates, but still manage to out-perform females in general (see Figure 3).
Remarkably, over the period 1984 to 1990, female basketball players, on
average, have graduated at a rate almost 18% higher than their male
counterparts which mirrors the difference in graduation rates between male and female
athletes overall (i. e., 14.7%). Consequently, while lower graduation rates
across sexes may be a function of data from basketball players, there is still
no clear explanation for why females, and female athletes in particular, exceed
the graduation rates of males by such a large margin. Furthermore, if
graduation rates are used as an index of academic achievement, the argument
might be made that an athletic dividend does exist for females.
Figure 2. Graduation rates for male
basketball and football players
Figure 3. Graduation rates for female
basketball players.
Another group that appears to benefit
from athletics when graduation rates are used to assess academic achievement is
black athletes. As seen in Figure 4, black female athletes on average graduated
at a rate of 53% compared to 39% for all black females, while black male
athletes graduated at a rate of 39.9% compared to 31.9% for all black males.
While no unequivocal rationale for the "athletic dividend" exists,
one might speculate that Division I athletes receive benefits not available to
their non-athletic peers. These include such things as: (a)athletic
scholarships, (b) tutors, (c) academic advisers, and (d) coaches whose jobs
depend on players making satisfactory academic progress. As well, in order to
complete four years of eligibility players must maintain acceptable grades.
While an "athletic dividend" exists for this group, graduation rates
for blacks still fall short of the average graduation rate of 55.4% for all
college students over the period examined.
Figure 4. Graduation rates for black
college students.
In summary, the argument that athletic
involvement contributes to a student’s academic standing is equivocal at best.
Everything else being equal there is no compelling evidence that involvement in
intercollegiate athletics provides an intellectual stimulus which in someway
generalizes to the classroom. On the other hand, the time and energy demands of
participating in big-time programs, especially in "revenue-producing"
sports, would seem to present barriers to excelling academically. Nonetheless,
involvement in athletics does seem to be associated with a desire on the part
of high school students to continue participating in college. This seems to be
partly a function of wanting to continue an athletic career, and partly a
function of embracing values of peers, coaches and teachers who steer athletes
toward higher education. To participate fully in collegiate athletics as an
incoming student in Division I and II athletes must first satisfy high school
requirements, GPA prerequisites , and standardized test criteria, which further
provides motivation to achieve academically. Once in college, to maintain
eligibility, athletes must also sustain a minimal academic standard and make
satisfactory progress toward a degree. Resources and encouragement also are
typically provided to ensure that athletes maintain their eligibility and
advance through their academic programs. The "athletic dividend" from
such treatment is most evident in graduation data which shows athletes
completing degrees at a higher rate than non-athletic cohorts. On balance, a
reasonable conclusion would be that although athletic involvement may present
barriers to excelling academically, or even choosing a course of study, it does
also open up opportunities for gaining access to higher education, and
completing a degree.
Social Mobility of Athletes
Perhaps one aspect of athletics that has
not received much attention is the impact of involvement on future economic and
social mobility after graduation. While studies are equivocal on whether or not
athletic experiences relate to the development of a variety of positive
personal attributes, few studies have used social and economic variables as
dependent variables. In a statistical investigation of 9787 individuals who
entered college in 1971 (i.e., 4394 males and 5393 females), Long
and Caudill (1991) attempted to determine whether athletic involvement
related to annual income a decade later. Control variables included a
constellation of personal attributes, along with academic and employment
measures. Results found a 4% increment for males (i. e., $652), and no effect
for females. A similar analysis done on 10 year graduation rates also showed an
advantage for athletes (i.e., males and females) of about 4%, even when other
predictors such as high school grades, SATs, race, parental income and
education were held constant. The authors do note that most individuals in the
sample attended smaller institutions (i.e., less than 5000), and consequently
were not part of "big time" programs. Finally, Long and Caudill
attributed their findings to the positive attributes alleged to be acquired
from athletic participation, including discipline, confidence, motivation and a
competitive spirit.
Such findings are consistent with a
number of older and smaller studies. For example, Husband (1957) found that
athletes graduating from Dartmouth in 1926 were, on average, earning 20% (i
.e., $17,124 vs. $14,280) more than their non-athletic peers by 1956. Schrupp
(1952) found a similar advantage for former University of Minnesota athletes
over non-athletes (i. e., a difference of $1360). Sack and Thiel (1979
studying former Notre Dame football players over the period 1946 to 1965, did
not find an income advantage for athletes over non-athletes, but they did find
that athletes had equivalent incomes with nonathletes, despite the fact that
they had come from poorer backgrounds. Interestingly, athletes also tended to have lower GPAs, take easier
majors, and go on for fewer graduate and professional degrees than
non-athletes. The authors also found that first string players had higher
incomes than non-starters, and that first stringers tended to be disproportionately
found in the ranks of business executives (i.e., presidents, vice presidents,
assistant vice presidents, or treasurers).
Despite such evidence, it remains
unclear what mechanisms, if any, can account for what appears to be a post
college income/occupation advantage to former athletes. Loy, McPherson, and
Kenyon (1978) suggest two possibilities. The first encompasses career
sponsorship. For what ever reasons, athletes may receive preferential treatment
when hired, or when up for a promotion. This explanation might fit well for
former athletes of "big time" programs who have enjoyed positive
publicity, and work for companies in a position which requires direct contact
with the public. A second explanation parallels that given by Long and Caudill
(1991) which suggests that athletes may have acquired certain attitudes and
behavior patterns (e.g., achievement motivation, leadership, assertiveness,
team player, etc.) which mesh well with corporate personnel needs. This latter
explanation would also fit in well with the idea that given equivalent
technical expertise, companies seek out employees who have better interpersonal
skills, and broader backgrounds. Seemingly, this rationale would fit better
with studies of former athletes who come from smaller programs. Certainly more
research is needed to determine the validity of the athlete-occupation-income
relationships. As well, as suggested in Husband’s study (1957), the causal link
between athletic involvement and post college mobility has still not been
unequivocally established. It is conceivable that the same personal attributes
which drive individuals to be successful at athletics, school politics, or
academics is responsible for post college success. Finally, studies are needed
to examine whether this pattern also holds for females.
Benefit of Athletics
Programs to Institutions
Just as arguments regarding whether or
not athletic involvement actually enhances the lives of participants are
equivocal and situationally specific, so too are beliefs regarding the impact
of athletic programs on institutions. Perhaps, one of the classic cases which
illustrates this point is the story of the men’s intercollegiate basketball
team at City College of New York (i.e., CCNY). CCNY had a Cinderella year and
won both the NIT and NCAA tournaments during the 1949-50 season. As conveyed in
HBO’s City Dump (1998), the school was known as "the Harvard of the
People" because the students who went there were intellectually gifted,
but typically the sons and daughters of first generation Americans who had not
yet gained access to more prestigious institutions. They could not afford to
pay much in tuition (CCNY was tuition free), normally commuted home after
classes, and were, or at least perceived themselves to be, of a different
social background than typical Harvard students. The starting team during the
1949-50 season was made up of three Jews and two blacks. In one scene City Dump
shows that when CCNY played legendary coach Adolph Rupp’s Kentucky team in
Madison Square Garden, the Kentucky players refused to even shake hands with
City’s players, inferring that they were less than worthy opponents. At the
time it was also widely known that Rupp did not recruit Blacks, and a number of
CCNY players were African Americans.
What comes through so clearly in this
story is that the team truly represented something a lot bigger than basketball
to the student body, and to the typical citizen of New York. Mort Sheinman, a
student from the class of 1954, conveys that although the Yankees had Joe
Dimaggio, the Yankees might have well been from a different planet. The CCNY
basketball players were "guys from my neighborhood" who competed with
the best teams in the nation, and ultimately went on to show everyone that the
potpourri of ethnic and racial groups that were represented at CCNY and in New
York were more than deserving of being included in the American mainstream. One
New Yorker put it best when he said: "It's not like they did it for us.
It's that they were us and did it." Marvin Kitman (Kitman, 1998) , a CCNY
student reporter at the time recently claimed:
"When we beat Bradley for the NIT crown, it
was the most important day in my life. At least until we also beat them in the
NCAA. Here was this bunch of ethnics, three Jews and two blacks on the starting
five, showing the rest of Middle America that we were something. We kicked the
crap, as we used to say on the streets of Bensonhurst, out of them."
The team received all the accoutrements
of celebrities, watches, rings, and even a New York City motorcade to celebrate
what they had achieved as a basketball team, and as representatives of an
institution and people crying out for recognition.
But, as conveyed in a review by Bark (1998), the following season was paradise lost, not
because CCNY could not repeat their magnificent 1949-50 season, but because the
hero’s were implicated in a massive point shaving scheme characterized by the
team either losing games it should not have lost, or winning by less than the
point spread had predicted. Bark put it well in conveying that "New
Yorkers reacted as though Santa Claus had been caught shoplifting at
Woolworth's." Former news correspondent and 1951CCNY graduate Martin Kalb
said in the film that it was "Truly betrayal on a biblical level."
Sportswriter Maurey Allen added: "That was the last time that I really
believed in pure idealism." Not only was point shaving disclosed, but it
was also disclosed that two of the CCNY players had forged entrance papers.
Frank Hogan, New York District attorney took criminal action against those
involved and some wound up serving jail time. Authorities at CCNY ultimately
de-emphasized the program. There would be no more capacity crowds at Madison
Square Garden cheering on the local boys.
This story is quintessential since it
represents both the best and the worst in what college sports can offer to an
institution. Clearly, the CCNY basketball team served to integrate a campus
going in many different directions. Students and the community at large
seemingly were eager to identify with their institution as one which brought
everyone recognition. But more so, there was a sense that the success of this
team confirmed that CCNY students had established themselves as being as worthy
of inclusion in the American mainstream as students at any of the more
traditional powers such as Kentucky, Kansas, Bradley, Stanford, and Michigan.
Having reached this ethereal goal, and celebrated in the limelight that comes
with such extraordinary achievement, made the havoc of it all being taken away
so abruptly more devastating than it would have been had the basketball squad
never achieved such glory. The team which had generated so much goodwill toward
CCNY, its students, and supporters, ultimately brought shame. The title
"City Dump" conveys not only that players "dumped" games,
but that this is where they belonged, and, ultimately, where they
metaphorically wound up.
An assessment of some beliefs about how
athletics programs affect institutions.
While it is evident that a successful
athletics program can help rally a disjointed college community around a
central focus, the issue of whether such a phenomenon really is more than just
a peripheral and ephemeral phenomenon with no meaningful relationship to the
central academic mission of the institution is controversial. As suggested from
historical overviews, does athletic success really result in a larger and more
qualified pool of applicant? Do alumni show greater interest and financial
support for their alma mater, if its teams are successful? Do public
universities get greater support from state legislatures? Is more money
available not only for athletics, but for academic programs when teams are
successful? For winning programs does income exceed expenses? In essence, what
is the net effect of going "big time", winning, and losing?
Enrollment. Since the late 19th
century many have believed that fielding a nationally competitive team is
beneficial to an institution’s enrollment, and general well-being. While this
contention has resulted in a great deal of debate over the years, actual data
with accompanying analyses have been lacking. For example, it was reported that
after North Carolina State University won the NCAA Division I men’s basketball
tournament in 1983, its applicant pool increased by 40% the following year (USA
Today, 1985, April 3). Boston College was also reported to have had a 30%
increase in its applicant pool the year after Doug Flutie won the Heisman
Trophy, and its team was the best in the East (Newsweek, 1985, April 8). The
University of South Carolina had a 23% increment in its pool of applicants in
1985, a year following its most wins in football. Wake Forest had a 14%
increase in applicants in 1995 credited largely to the success of its
basketball and football teams (Folkenflik, 1995). Even academically prestigious
Northwestern University experienced an increase in applicants after its
football team went to the Rose Bowl in 1996 (Selingo, 1997).
In an empirical study which examined
whether "big-time", winning football programs affect enrollment
patterns in colleges, McCormick and Tinsley (1987) concluded
that both the size and quality of an institutions applicant pool varies with
whether it has a "big time" athletics program (i.e., whether it
belongs to a major conference), and the fortunes of its football team. Using SAT of incoming freshmen as a dependent variable
they regressed a cluster of institutional variables including (a) number of
volumes in the library, (b) student/faculty ratio, (c) size of endowment, (d)
salary of professors, (e) age of university, (f) tuition, and (g) and whether
the school engaged in major college athletics. In all models tested, they found
athletic involvement to be positive and significant, which means, that
everything else being equal, schools which participate in major college
athletics have students with higher SATs. On average, this amounted to a 33
point increment. In a second analysis McCormick and Tinsley examined whether
schools in major football conferences with higher winning percentages tended to
attract students with higher SATs. Results showed that winning was related to
SATs, but only to a modest degree. From these two sets of results the authors
concluded that athletics and academics, at least from a student applicant pool
perspective, have a symbiotic rather than antagonistic relationship. In their
discussion they do pose the interesting question of why some prominent
universities, such as those found in the Ivy league do not promote big time
programs. The authors hypothesize that possibly because of these institution’s
academic reputations, historical traditions, and financial resources they are
not impacted by athletics in the same way as colleges represented in their
study.
Consequently, from the limited evidence
available, it does appear that having a big-time, successful athletics programs
does have a favorable impact on attracting a larger number of students.
However, it also appears that there are many institutions where no relationship
exists. Historical tradition, and the nature of the institution appear to be
mediating variables.
Money
To get a sense of the amounts of money
involved in intercollegiate sports we will start with the NCAA budget (NCAA, 2003). As seen in Table 1, the NCAA had an
income of $422,233,000 during 2002-2003, $370 million (87.63%) comes from
television. Championships yield another $38,233,000 ($25,400,000 of which is
from the men's D1 basketball championship).A piechart of budgeted income can be
found by clicking on budget.
When television is combined with the D1 men's basketball championships it
becomes apparent that this event, which is in the midst of an ongoing 7 year,
$1.75 billion contract with CBS, provides the largest portion of the NCAA's
income.
On the expense side one sees that
$245,026,000 (approximately 58%) is returned to Division I members through a
variety of programs, with the Division 1 men’s basketball fund being the
largest. The Division II allocation of $18,452,000 represents approximately 4%
of the budget, while Division III receives $13,427,00 which was about 3% of
expenses.A pie chart of expenses can be found by clicking on expenses.
Table 1. NCAA Operating Budget 2002-2003
REVENUE Budget/Expenses
---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
Revenue |
Expenses |
||
|
Television |
$370,000,000 |
||
|
Royalties |
$3,300,000 |
||
|
Division I men's basketball |
$25,400,000 |
||
|
Other Division I championships |
$12,128,000 |
||
|
Division II championships |
$440,000 |
||
|
Division III championships |
$265,000 |
||
|
Sales and services |
$3,460,000 |
||
|
General revenue (investment, dues, fees) |
$7,240,000 |
||
|
Total NCAA operating revenue |
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
Expenses |
|
||
|
Distribution to D I Athletic Programs ((Note 1) |
$195,000,000 |
||
|
Distribution to Student-Athlete Program (Note 2) |
$44,209,000 |
||
|
Distribution to Conference Programs |
$5,817,000 |
||
|
Total Distribution to D 1 Members |
$245,026,000 |
||
|
Championships |
|
||
|
Men's Basketball |
|
||
|
Game Expenses |
$5,460,000 |
||
|
Travel |
$10,411,000 |
||
|
Other D1 Championships |
|
||
|
Game Expenses |
$8,160,500 |
||
|
Travel |
$26,860,500 |
||
|
Other D1 Programs |
|
||
|
Basketball Mentoring |
$550,000 |
||
|
Championship Promotions |
$910,000 |
||
|
Other D1 Programs |
$1,460,000 |
||
|
Total D1 Expenses and Allocations |
$297,378,000 (70.43%) |
||
|
|
|
||
|
D2 Expenses and Allocations (Note 4) |
|
||
|
Championship Game Expenses |
$2,232,000 |
||
|
Championship Travel |
$9,925,000 |
||
|
Distribution of Enhancement Fund |
$3,900,000 |
||
|
Programs and Other Expenses |
$2,407,000 |
||
|
Championship and Program Support |
$214,200 |
||
|
Funding from D2 Reserves |
($226,200) |
||
|
Total D2 Expenses and Allocations |
$18,452,000 (4.37%) |
||
|
|
|
||
|
D3 Expenses and Allocations (No |
|
||
|
Championship Game Expenses |
$2,365,000 |
||
|
Championship Travel |
$8,215,000 |
||
|
Programs and Other Expenses |
$3,019,000 |
||
|
Championship and Program Support |
$563,530 |
||
|
Funding from D3 Reserves |
($735,530) |
||
|
Total D3 Expenses and Allocations |
$13,427,000 (3.18%) |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Association-Wide Expenses |
|
||
|
Student - Athlete Welfare and Youth Programs and Services (Note 5) |
|
||
|
Catastrophic Insurance |
$10,000,000 |
||
|
Sports Science |
$3,969,000 |
||
|
Initial Eligibility |
$965,000 |
||
|
Youth Programs |
$2,308,000 |
||
|
Award Ceremonies |
$486,000 |
||
|
Scholarships |
$362,000 |
||
|
NCAA Foundation - Student Athlete Programs |
$386,000 |
||
|
Sports Agent/Gambling and basketball certification |
$263,000 |
||
|
Total Student - Athlete Welfare and Youth Programs and Services |
$18,739,000 |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Membership Programs and Services |
|
||
|
Public Affairs |
$1,859,000 |
||
|
Branding, Broadcasting and Promotions |
$8,900,000 |
||
|
Convention and seminars |
$975,000 |
||
|
Education Outreach and Professional Development |
$2,784,000 |
||
|
Liability insurance |
$3,110,000 |
||
|
Officiating improvement programs |
$785,000 |
||
|
Research |
$941,000 |
||
|
Athletics certification and education |
$759,000 |
||
|
Grants and other services |
$151,000 |
||
|
Other Program Services: |
|
||
|
Membership services (Note 7) |
$4,181,000 |
||
|
Enforcement Services and Basketball Certification (Note 7) |
$3,852,000 |
||
|
Championships (Note 7) |
$4,349,500 |
||
|
Education services (Note 7) |
$3,559,000 |
||
|
Total Membership Programs and Services |
$36,205,500 |
||
|
Total Programs and Services |
$54,944,500 |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Legal Services and Contingencies |
$7,000,000 |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Governance/Committees |
$4,032,000 |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Association-Wide Expenses |
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES: |
|
||
|
General and Administrative Expenses (Note 6) |
$11,016,000 |
||
|
Executive and governance staff (Note 7) |
$5,438,000 |
||
|
Public affairs (Note 7) |
$3,588,500 |
||
|
Finance and information services (Note 7) |
$4,135,000 |
||
|
Contingency-Administrative Services |
$400,000 |
||
|
Total Administrative Services |
$24,577,500 |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Division 2 and 3 Championships and Program Support |
($778,000) |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Total Association-Wide Expenses |
$89,776,000 |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Total NCAA Operating Budget |
$419,033.000 |
||
|
|
|
||
|
NCAA Presidential Transition Reserve |
$600,000 |
||
|
Association-Wide Reserve (Note 3) |
$2,300,000 |
||
|
Repair and replacement reserve |
$300,000 |
||
|
Funded Operating/Furniture and Equipment Reserve |
- |
||
|
|
|
||
|
Total Budget Expenses |
$422,233,000 |
Note 1: Amount sent to institutions and conferences to subsidize
student-athlete's grants-in-aid and sports programs.Note 2: Distribution to student-athlete programs
includes the academic enhancement fund, special assistance fund and
student-athlete opportunity fund. Note 3: The membership trust/association-wide reserve
is money allocated by each respective Division forfuture use for that
respective Division. Note 4:
Division II and III allocations are calculated at 4.37% and 3.18%,
respectively, of NCAA operating revenue. Note 5: 'Student-Athlete Welfare and Youth Programs and
Services' does not include the distribution to studentathleteprograms. Note
6: General and
administrative expenses include facilities costs, employee procurement,
computer services, furniture and equipment, depreciation, and other general
office expenses. Note 7:
Includes salaries, payroll taxes, pension contributions, insurance, travel
& entertainment expenses, postage, telephone, printing and duplicating for
each functional area.
From a casual overview of income and expenses it is apparent that income from
Division I commercial endeavors accounts for virtually all of the revenue of
the NCAA. Logically, most of the operating budget goes back to Division I. On
the other hand Divisions II and III generate less than 1% of the NCAA’s income,
but receive back over 7% of the money dispersed. It is also evident that the
NCAA spends money on many things such as research, professional development,
youth clinics, sport sciences and public relations, but it also spends
approximately 6% of its budget on administration.
Certainly, one of the NCAA’s prime
missions is to promote intercollegiate athletics. The largest item in its
operating budget is the Division I basketball fund (23%). Here money is
allocated to conferences based on the number of games their team’s played in
the NCAA tournament over a six year rolling period. Independents receive the
same allocation. For each game a team played the conference or independent
received approximately $130,697 in 2002-03. For example, a conference received
$784,182 if its teams played in 6 games over the past six years. The NCAA urges
conferences to divide this money equally among all conference members.
The NCAA also supplements athletic
scholarships through its Grants in Aid Fund allocated to Division I institutions
based on the number of athletic scholarships it awards. In 2001-2002 this
amounted to $144.05/athlete for the first 50, $288.19/athlete for 51-100,
$1440.50/athlete for 101-151, $2881.00 for counts above 151. Consequently, an
institution with 82.77 scholarships will receive a check of $16,644, one with
165.74 athletes $138,979, and one with 245.42 grants in aid will receive
$368,538 from the NCAA. From this formula it is evident that the more
athletics' scholarships awarded by an institution the greater the subsidy per
student. .
The Sports Sponsorship Fund attempts to
promote expansion of the number of sports offered by an institution. For sports
in which the NCAA sponsors championships, and for those qualifying as emerging
sports for women, the NCAA grants schools $13,827 per sport beginning with the
14th sport offered. Thus, an institution with 25 qualifying sports would have
received $152,097 in 12001-02 from the NCAA.
In accordance with its goal to help
athletes academically the NCAA has allocated $16,780,00 million, which amounts
to $51,000 to each Division I school, for the purpose of providing funds for
enhancing academic programs and services for student-athletes. Suggested uses
include the support of tutorial services, equipment (e.g., computers), supplies
and any additional personnel to facilitate this objective. Another item in the
budget is $10,425,000 for a special assistance fund. Its purpose is to assist athletes in Division I
with special financial needs in emergency situations where financial assistance
is not otherwise available. These funds are administered by conferences and can
be used to pay for such things as clothing, academic supplies, family
emergencies, and medical costs not covered by insurance. Money is also
allocated by the NCAA through its Conference Grants Program to support such
things as drug education, management training in athletics for ethnic
minorities and women.
The overall picture of the NCAA budget
appears to be one of supporting its programs, especially Division I men’s
basketball from which most of its income is derived. It also rewards
conferences and independents who consistently do well in the post season
basketball championship. Interestingly, it also allocates a greater share of
its budget to programs that support more scholarship athletes, and a greater
number of teams. Seemingly, these items present somewhat of a mixed picture
that can be interpreted as promoting increased commercialization, increased
participation opportunities for students, or both. Other items, such as those
allocated for academic assistance, special assistance, professional
development, research, sport science, gender-equity, support for ethnic
minorities, and allocations to Divisions II and III reflect an NCAA that
recognizes many of the current issues facing collegiate athletics. Whether
enough money that is derived from its commercial enterprises is redistributed
in an appropriate fashion is worthy of discussion. Certainly, an issue that
might be raised is why the NCAA redistributes funds to conferences based on the
number of games won in its men's basketball tournament over a six year period.
In accordance with some of its own initiatives, money could be distributed
based on criteria such as how well a school promotes gender equity, its record
for graduating athletes, the academic achievement of its athletes, and its
employment history for hiring persons of varying racial and ethnic backgrounds.
Despite all the Money, Most Schools
Operate in the Red
While a great deal of money is involved
in college athletics, most Division I programs have been reported to be in the
red. According to a report from the National Association of College Business
Officers (Lederman, 1993), fewer than 50 colleges in Division I actually make a
profit from athletics. During the 1980s the report asserts, sport expenses grew
at a rate three times that of inflation, which was much faster than revenues.
Notwithstanding the NCAA's distribution of money to members, costs for scholarships,
personnel, recruiting, facilities, equipment, meals, and travel typically
out-pace revenue.
More recently, Fulks (Rolnick, 1998) concluded from an ongoing series of
studies on financing athletics' programs that in Division I-A during 1997 only
43 schools had revenues that exceeded expenses, and that without subsidies from
universities (mean = $1.3 million) the average program would have lost
$823,000. In Division 1-AA the average loss was $1,962,000, and in Division
1-AAA it was $1,874,000. However, the study also found that 71% of Division 1-A
football programs showed a profit (mean = $5 million), while the remaining 29%
lost on average $1 million. Furthermore, the study reported that average
expenses for Division I athletics had nearly tripled over the period 1985
through 1997, going from $6.9 million to $17.3 million. Finally, participation
was up as a result of more programs being offered for females. The message from
this study is that if a program is to make money it should be more like Florida
State whose football team took in $18.7 million dollars when gate receipts,
NCAA and conference subsidies, and fees for licensed merchandise were summed.
In 1998 USA Today published the revenues
and expenses for athletic programs in major conferences (USA
Today, 1998). Football and basketball were singled out and remaining sports
were grouped as a conglomerate. To get a sense of what is going on financially,
Table 2 shows data for The Atlantic Coast Conference (i. e., ACC). As seen in
the bottom section of the table which shows the overall outcome when all income
and expenses are computed, 5 of the 9 schools were in the red for the year.
When one examines football one sees that only Georgia Tech lost money, and in
men's basketball only Clemson was a loser. When finances for men's basketball
and football were averaged a positive bottom line resulted. However, when one
examines women’s basketball, and other men's and women's programs it is readily
seen that programs cost schools more than they brought in. On average women’s
basketball lost $558,596, men's other sports lost $1,392,581, and women's other
sports lost $1,586,221. Consequently, one can see that even for a very high
profile conference running in the black is not automatic (4 out of the 9 were
in positive territory), and to do so depends on income generated from football
and men's basketball programs.
Table 2. Revenue and Expenses for ACC
Athletic Programs 1997.
|
School |
Foot. Rev |
Foot. Exp |
Net Football |
Bask. Rev |
Bask. Exp. |
Net Bask |
|
Clemson |
9,064,238 |
6,091,733 |
2,972,505 |
1,021,613 |
1,503,179 |
-481,566 |
|
Duke |
4,508,098 |
4,208,113 |
299,985 |
4,905,310 |
1,411,420 |
3,493,890 |
|
Florida St |
11,646,137 |
2,409,277 |
9,236,860 |
4,494,677 |
706,205 |
3,788,472 |
|
Georgia Tech |
3,160,497 |
3,351,683 |
-191,186 |
1,682,613 |
1,043,059 |
639,554 |
|
Maryland |
4,986,593 |
4,175,354 |
811,239 |
5,084,244 |
1,490,523 |
3,593,721 |
|
N. Carolina |
7,252,822 |
2,811,277 |
4,441,545 |
6,682,435 |
1,279,534 |
5,402,901 |
|
N.C. State |
5,007,178 |
2,669,960 |
2,337,218 |
4,314,285 |
976,792 |
3,337,493 |
|
Virginia |
5,496,340 |
3,467,377 |
2,028,963 |
2,582,868 |
922,798 |
1,660,070 |
|
Wake Forest |
3,821,782 |
3,350,813 |
470,969 |
4,608,310 |
916,433 |
3,691,877 |
|
sum |
54,943,685 |
32,535,587 |
22,408,098 |
35,376,355 |
10,249,943 |
25,126,412 |
|
Mean |
6,104,854 |
3,615,065 |
2,489,789 |
3,930,706 |
1,138,883 |
2,791,824 |
|
School |
Wom. Bask. Rev |
Wom. Bask. Exp. |
Bask. W. Net |
|
Clemson |
52,538 |
548,160 |
-495,622 |
|
Duke |
0 |
629,011 |
-629,011 |
|
Florida St |
9,216 |
558,442 |
-549,226 |
|
Georgia Tech |
44,430 |
624,011 |
-579,581 |
|
Maryland |
31,170 |
689,202 |
-658,032 |
|
N. Carolina |
30,487 |
488,264 |
-457,777 |
|
N.C. State |
99,561 |
580,680 |
-481,119 |
|
Virginia |
228,388 |
781,398 |
-553,010 |
|
Wake Forest |
8,746 |
632,729 |
-623,983 |
|
sum |
504,536 |
5,531,897 |
-5,027,361 |
|
Mean |
56,060 |
614,655 |
-558,596 |
|
|
Other M Rev |
Other M Expense |
Net Mens Other |
.Other Wom. Rev |
Wom. Exp. |
Net Womens Other |
|
Clemson |
289,835 |
1,830,552 |
-1,540,717 |
54,044 |
1,442,145 |
-1,388,101 |
|
Duke |
NA |
1,883,990 |
-1,883,990 |
NA |
1,810,039 |
-1,810,039 |
|
Florida St |
440,990 |
1,251,521 |
-810,531 |
230,646 |
1,944,044 |
-1,713,398 |
|
Georgia Tech |
187,476 |
1,170,244 |
-982,768 |
2,685 |
1,026,583 |
-1,023,898 |
|
Maryland |
59,455 |
1,738,456 |
-1,679,001 |
11,592 |
2,285,567 |
-2,273,975 |
|
N. Carolina |
187,872 |
1,833,455 |
-1,645,583 |
173,861 |
2,112,992 |
-1,939,131 |
|
N.C. State |
96,092 |
1,099,361 |
-1,003,269 |
31,787 |
744,086 |
-712,299 |
|
Virginia |
267,611 |
1,919,335 |
-1,651,724 |
79,120 |
2,138,458 |
-2,059,338 |
|
Wake Forest |
185,602 |
1,521,245 |
-1,335,643 |
NA |
1,355,813 |
-1,355,813 |
|
sum |
1,714,933 |
14,248,159 |
-12,533,226 |
583,735 |
14,859,727 |
-14,275,992 |
|
Mean |
190,548 |
1,583,129 |
-1,392,581 |
64,859 |
1,651,081 |
-1,586,221 |
* 0 was used in computations where NA
appeared.
|
|
Net Totals |
|
Clemson |
-933,501 |
|
Duke |
-529,165 |
|
Florida St |
9,952,177 |
|
Georgia Tech |
-2,137,879 |
|
Maryland |
-206,048 |
|
N. Carolina |
5,801,955 |
|
N.C. State |
3,478,024 |
|
Virginia |
-575,039 |
|
Wake Forest |
847,407 |
|
Average |
1,744,215 |
Doing the same analysis with a lower profile
conference such as the Mid-American shows even a much more serious imbalance
between income and expenses. Table 3 reveals that all 11 schools loose money in
football (average = $947, 445), and men’s (average=$220,484) and women’s
basketball (average=$327,966). As well, the average deficit for all other men’s
sports was $777,591, and for all other women's sports was $996,454. As a
conglomerate these institutions had an average athletic deficit of $3,269,940,
with a range of $2,903,143 for Western Michigan to $4,210,706 for Kent State.
Consequently, unlike the higher profile ACC where football and men's basketball
can pay for other athletic programs, Mid-Atlantic Conference Athletic Programs
do not generate sufficient income in any sports to offset costs in other areas.
Table 3. Revenue and Expenses for
Mid-American Athletic Programs 1997.
|
Mid-American |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
School |
Foot. Rev. |
Foot. Exp. |
Net Football |
Bask. Rev. |
Bask. Exp. |
Net Basketball |
|
Akron |
$573,098 |
1,374,795 |
-801,697 |
115,152 |
433,014 |
-317,862 |
|
Ball State. |
496,989 |
1,835,998 |
-1,339,009 |
513,208 |
594,609 |
-81,401 |
|
Bowl. Green |
803,608 |
1,596,943 |
-793,335 |
192,247 |
420,016 |
-227,769 |
|
C. Michigan |
796,037 |
1,291,434 |
-495,397 |
189,383 |
324,109 |
-134,726 |
|
E. Michigan |
708,059 |
1,679,814 |
-971,755 |
137,082 |
462,606 |
-325,524 |
|
Kent State |
591,758 |
1,809,908 |
-1,218,150 |
98,361 |
528,014 |
-429,653 |
|
Miami (Ohio) |
825,604 |
1,542,792 |
-717,188 |
232,800 |
482,994 |
-250,194 |
|
N. Illinois |
1,097,099 |
2,340,266 |
-1,243,167 |
209,960 |
549,589 |
-339,629 |
|
Ohio U |
502,064 |
1,757,045 |
-1,254,981 |
419,387 |
482,156 |
-62,769 |
|
Toledo |
866,744 |
1,948,850 |
-1,082,106 |
491,046 |
526,360 |
-35,314 |
|
W. Michigan |
931,836 |
1,436,946 |
-505,110 |
123,676 |
344,161 |
-220,485 |
|
Sum |
8,192,896 |
18,614,791 |
(10,421,895) |
2,722,302 |
5,147,628 |
(2,425,326) |
|
Mean |
744,809 |
1,692,254 |
(947,445) |
247,482 |
467,966 |
(220,484) |
|
School |
Wom. Bask. Rev |
Wom. Bask. Exp. |
Net W Basketball |
|
Akron |
5,640 |
297,552 |
-291,912 |
|
Ball State |
14,038 |
349,952 |
-335,914 |
|
Bowl. Green |
29,508 |
294,633 |
-265,125 |
|
C. Michigan |
16,865 |
295,122 |
-278,257 |
|
E. Michigan |
780 |
263,611 |
-262,831 |
|
Kent State |
12,383 |
458,141 |
-445,758 |
|
Miami(Ohio) |
6,256 |
334,119 |
-327,863 |
|
N. Illinois |
61,175 |
417,758 |
-356,583 |
|
Ohio U |
14,005 |
398,015 |
-384,010 |
|
Toledo |
41,170 |
369,577 |
-328,407 |
|
W. Michigan |
12,130 |
343,098 |
-330,968 |
|
sum |
213,950 |
3,821,578 |
-3,607,628 |
|
average |
19,450 |
347,416 |
-327,966 |
|
School... |
Other Men Rev. |
Men Exp. |
Net Mens Other |
Other Wom. Rev |
Wom. Exp. |
Net Womens |
|
Akron |
10,038 |
608,509 |
-598,471 |
898 |
548,676 |
-547,778 |
|
Ball State |
60515 |
968,532 |
-908,017 |
56,059 |
1,307,060 |
-1,251,001 |
|
Bowl. Green |
364,455 |
1,137,543.00 |
-773,088 |
3,938 |
856,500 |
-852,562 |
|
C. Michigan |
85,010 |
554,240 |
-469,230 |
57,836 |
967,975 |
-910,139 |
|
E. Michigan |
0 |
973,302 |
-973,302 |
0 |
1,087,489 |
-1,087,489 |
|
Kent State |
9,487 |
939,269.00 |
-929,782 |
8,357 |
1,195,720 |
-1,187,363 |
|
Miami (Ohio) |
112,914 |
1,411,663.00 |
-1,298,749 |
8,070 |
1,258,630 |
-1,250,560 |
|
N. Illinois. |
115,980 |
688,421 |
-572,441 |
169,242 |
1,291,810 |
-1,122,568 |
|
Ohio U. |
6,215 |
537,871 |
-531,656 |
0 |
690,076 |
-690,076 |
|
Toledo |
75,678 |
670,881 |
-595,203 |
28,930 |
1,147,364 |
-1,118,434 |
|
W. Michigan. |
191,187 |
1,094,745 |
-903,558 |
12,097 |
955,119 |
-943,022 |
|
sum |
1,031,479 |
9,584,976 |
-8,553,497 |
345,427 |
11,306,419 |
-10,960,992 |
|
average |
93,771 |
871,361 |
-777,591 |
31,402 |
1,027,856 |
-996,454 |
|
Totals |
NET |
|
School |
|
|
Akron |
-2,557,720 |
|
Ball State |
-3,915,342 |
|
Bowl. Green |
-2,911,879 |
|
C. Michigan |
-2,287,749 |
|
E. Michigan |
-3,620,901 |
|
Kent State |
-4,210,706 |
|
Miami (Ohio) |
-3,844,554 |
|
N. Illinois. |
-3,634,388 |
|
Ohio U |
-2,923,492 |
|
Toledo |
-3,159,464 |
|
W. Michigan |
-2,903,143 |
|
sum |
-35,969,338 |
|
average |
-3,269,940 |
Consequently, what we see from these
analyses is that contrary to popular beliefs, participating in Division I does
not necessarily result in a positive cash flow. Institutions which "make
money" from athletics do so through their football and/or men's’
basketball programs. All other programs, across all conferences reviewed by USA
Today (i. e., ACC, Big East, Big Ten, Big 12, Big West, Conference USA,
Mid-American, Pact 10, SEC, WAC) cost more to run than they generate in income.
Perhaps, this explains why paying large salaries to coaches who can recruit
"high profile" football and basketball players, produce "winners",
fill stadiums and arenas, attract television coverage, and participate in
post-season championships is so important. If schools can not make money in
these sports, their athletic programs are certain to run in the red.
Interestingly, the athletics' department is like all other departments in
colleges with respect to their inability to generate enough revenue to pay
their expenses. However, most athletics programs, unlike those designated in
the academic sphere, have a written or unwritten mandate to be self-supporting.
More recently, Fulks
(2002a)has compiled data on athletic finances and the NCAA has published
his report which contains over 100 pages of tables breaking down revenues and
expenses for virtually every question of interest to sport's administrators and
decision makers. As seen in Table 4, which collates data from Table 2.3 in his
report deficits in DI - AA and DI - AAA appear to be sizable and rising over
the period 1993 - 2001. As well, it should be noted that for some institutions
deficits are even greater since some institutions within each category have a
revenue surplus which tends to moderate average deficits. Furthermore, capital
expenses are not included in these computations, so that these figures
represent conservative estimates. Since budgets must ultimately be balanced, the
question arises of how these deficits are paid?
Table 4. Athletic Program Operating
Deficits in D - I (1000s of dollars)
|
|
D I-A |
D I - AA |
D I - AAA |
|
Year |
|
|
|
|
1993 |
200,000 |
1,400,000 |
1,100,000 |
|
1995 |
200,000 |
1,700,000 |
1,400,000 |
|
1997 |
800,000 |
2,000,000 |
1,800,000 |
|
1999 |
0 |
2,200,000 |
2,500,000 |
|
2001 |
600,000 |
3,400,000 |
2,800,000 |
Notes:
Division I-A: In accordance with NCAA bylaws, the group includes
those institutions that play at least 60 percent of their regular-season
football games against other Division I-A institutions. All but four basketball
games (both men’s and women’s programs) must be against other Division I teams.
Seven men’s and seven women’s, or alternatively six men’s and eight women’s
sports, must be sponsored. There are also requirements for attendance,
scheduling and financial aid.
Division I-AA: These institutions must play more than 50 percent of
their regular-season football games against Division I-A or I-AA institutions.
All but four basketball games (both men’s and women’s programs) must be against
other Division I teams. Seven men’s and seven’s women’s, or alternatively six
men’s and eight women’s sports, must be sponsored. There are also requirements
for scheduling and financial aid.
Division I-AAA: This group of institutions does not sponsor football.
Other requirements are identical to those of Divisions I-A and I-AA
Who pays for deficits?
As with shortfalls in personal finance, a
strategy must be devised to find money elsewhere to make up deficits. One
possibility is to transfer money from a school’s general operating budget into
its athletics budget. This would parallel how Division III works, whereby the
entire athletics' budget is normally allocated from an institutions
instructional funds. As might be anticipated, this is not a popular strategy in
Division I where programs are larger and viewed as more of a commercial
endeavor than an educational one. As well, deficits are significantly greater
than the costs of entirel Division III programs. Athletics pundit Murray
Sperber (1990) has, however, questioned such a practice since he believes that
money that could be, and should be used for academic instructional purposes
should not be allocated to programs that are detached from a university’s
central mission. He gives the example of teaching an English course with 150
students, arguing that if funds which went to offset athletics deficits were
allocated instead to the English department, section sizes could be reduced and
the educational process for many students enhanced. This argument, of course,
could be generalized to encompass scientific equipment that does not get
purchased, courses that do not get taught, financial aid to needy students that
does not get awarded, and maintenance of facilities that does not get done. It
is apparent that Sperber’s argument is strong and politically popular.
Consequently, funds to offset deficits must be found elsewhere.
Perhaps, this issue is best encapsulated
by the ongoing debate occurring at Rutger's University (Naughton,
199). A group known as Rutgers 1000 has been trying to generate support to force
Rutgers to drop-out of the Big-East, stop awarding athletic scholarships, and
reduce its expenditures on sports. Part of the motivation for this group comes
from the estimated athletics deficits of between $3 and $6 million dollars
during each of the past few years. Yet, Rutger's went out and hired a new
athletic director, Robert Mulcahy, who was able to generate enough support to
obtain $3 million dollars from the state legislature to renovate and expand
administrative offices at the Rutger's athletic center. The juxtaposition of
losses with increased expenditures in a program creating a financial drain on
the university is enigmatic. But, the University administration remains
supportive of the athletics programs. Dean of the college Carl Kirschner argues
: "Rutgers is a major public research institution with multiple
responsibilities to multiple populations, and one I believe is allowing student
athletes to participate in competitive athletics." University president,
Francis Lawrence, also conveys the importance of using athletics as a way to
cultivate support from the state legislature. He claims that "… Good
sports teams are a way to win friends and influence people." Seemingly,
the issue is complex, and athletics deficits can be offset in ways that are
perceived by some to actually result in an overall net gain.
Student fees
Apparently, at least part of athletic
deficits are being made up by increasing student fees. According to Mangan (1994) in 1989 3% of a Division 1-As athletic
department’s budget was made up by student fee. In 1993 it had grown to 6%. In
Divisions I-AA and I-AAA percentages had grown from 14% and 17% to 25% and 32%,
respectively. Mangan further reports that in many states universities are
prohibited from using tuition funds to support athletics’ programs, but they
can use supplementary fees. She gives the example of Virginia being such a
state, and in 1994 $800 of a students fees at the University of Virginia went
to the athletic department which had a budget of $8.2 million dollars, 80% of
which was generated from such funds. At William and Mary students were paying
$660 for athletics, which Mangan conveyed was surprising to some students since
components of their general fees were not broken down. At the University of
North Carolina at Greensboro (i. e., UNCG) students were irate to see their
athletic fees climb by 80% after the school moved to Division I in 1991 (Selingo, 1997). Fees climbed to $1003 a year which was
just $13 dollars less than in-state tuition! Four-hundred and twenty-two
dollars of their fees pay for 80% of the $3.6 million dollar athletics budget,
since the department has been unable to generate much income itself. Part of
the rationale for going "big time" was to attract more men to a
school which had transitioned from being a women's institution, and to promote
its development effort. Unfortunately for UNCG the impact in both areas has
been inconsequential, but the financial costs for operating the program have
increased significantly above what they would have been had the school remained
in Division III.
The University of Houston has also been
doing some sole searching. The athletics' program has run deficits in the $4 to
$5 million dollar range. Its total athletics budget in 1996 was about $13
million dollars, $2 million of which was paid by student fees (Managan, 1996).
As previously noted, faculty think that money appropriated for making up the
shortfall should be used for hiring more faculty, supporting graduate
assistants, and improving library resources. The University of Houston has been
among the elite athletic schools in the country, having alumni that include
basketball standout Akeem Olajuwon and Clyde Drexler, track stars Carl Lewis
and Leroy Burrell, and Heisman Trophy winner Andre Ware. But the program has
run deficits for most of the decade, is near the bottom in Division I as far as
graduation rates are concerned, and has had a football program that has been on
probation for rules infractions. As well, students at the school do not seem
particularly interested in athletics, and in general, do not have the time to
attend contests. Houston is a commuter school, and students often work in
addition to attending classes. While it is clear that the program has seen
better days, there are still those who think that a major university needs not
only excel academically, but athletically as well. Alumni John Moore is one
such individual, who in 1991, with his wife gave $51.4 million to the
university, $29 million of which went to a new athletics' center. He, for one,
thinks that athletics is an important part of college life for all students.
Coupled with increasing student fees to
support athletic programs is the subtle issue of general financial aid. As athletic
fees increase, so does the cost of attending college, which directly affects
the amount of aid for which a student is eligible. Consequently, institutions,
states, and the federal government, who support various financial aid programs,
are indirectly providing funding through students to finance athletic programs
(Athletics and Their Costs, 1993). This is typically a hidden cost that would
not be popular with non-athletic constituencies. Sperber (1990), for example,
reported that in a 1988 poll in Arkansas, 75% of respondents favored limiting
state support of college athletics, and 71% were in favor of college athletics
programs being self-supporting. This would suggest that athletics was not
viewed as central to the mission of higher education and worthy of the type of
support typically given to academic programs. Thus, state tax dollars, in many
instances, may not be going directly to support athletic programs, but may be
indirectly routed through aid packages to students who then must pay athletic
fees.
Another issue regarding payment of fees
by students that gets little attention is related to the unequivocal finding
that non-revenue producing sports operate at a significant deficit, and afford
virtually no benefit to the typical student. Whereas the case can be made that
football and basketball programs may provide entertainment, and a rallying
point around which a community can unify, non-revenue producing sports receive
little attention on campus and provide value only to participants and coaches.
Yet, these programs are expensive and require coaching staffs, scholarships,
facilities, and travel budgets which are similar, but somewhat smaller in
scope, than larger football and basketball programs. As well, the typical
student normally has little chance of participating for these teams on a
walk-on basis. Nevertheless, students must support these programs through their
fees. From an administrative perspective, such programs are justified not
because of their inherent value to an institution, but because a minimum number
of sports teams are required by the NCAA to qualify for Division I or II
status.
Reducing Deficits
An alternative response to running large
deficits and increasing student fees was made by a number of institutions that
decided to leave Division I for Division III (Blum, 1994).
One such institution was Hardin-Simmons University, a small Baptist institution
in West Texas. During the 1930s, 40s, and 50s it had a competitive football
team, sent players to the pros, and even played in post season bowl games. But,
in the late 1950s and early 1960s it hit on hard times, and had five
consecutive losing seasons. Consequently, Hardin-Simmons decided to eliminate
its football team. After its other teams competed in Division I for five
additional years, it made the leap to Division III. By so doing, Hardin-Simmons
was able to bring back their football program. In addition, their other teams
have done well, and they are able to offer more teams which had twice as many
students involved in athletics than before they changed divisions. In the final
analysis the college community, including alumni who participated at the
Division I level, seem to think that as long as games are exciting and
competitive, which Division a school competes in makes little difference.
An issue that appears to create debate
is whether or not students should be made to support a program which may be of
only tangential interest to them, and not relate directly to their academic
work. A counter argument made by administrators is that whether or not the
athletics program is of interest to a particular student is not of paramount
importance, but whether or not the program is valuable to the campus as a
whole. The argument for increased student applications, increased alumni
support, increased appropriations from state legislatures, and the integrating
effect athletics can have on a campus are usually invoked as rationales for
justifying fees.
Are Alumni Donations Really Dependent
on Athletic Success?
The belief that a successful athletics
program can translate into increased giving to a college has been around for
many years. Essentially, those who advocate this view argue that alumni like to
be associated with successful programs, and when teams do well, the stature of
the institution from which they received their degree is enhanced and,
indirectly, so are they. Consequently, to show their appreciation, and to help
maintain such achievements, alumni are more likely to make donations to their
alma mater. This belief has been widely debated, and an unequivocal
generalization regarding its validity seems beyond empirical support. Unlike
the hard numbers that can be reported for the total amount of money donated to
a college over a specified time period, it is virtually impossible to tease out
the percentage of gifts given as a consequence of athletics success. To do so
would require a comprehensive understanding of donor motivations. Seemingly,
these are complex and a product of many factors.
That athletic success and development
drives do not always go hand in hand was brought home to me during a panel
discussion several years ago. I asked a president of a prestigious small
college whether he believed that winning teams and alumni giving were directly
related. The president claimed that at his institution there was no
relationship, and gave a timely example. In the previous year the football team
had lost every game, athlete’s spirits were low, and as one might expect, the
campus had difficulty rallying around the program. Yet the Development Office
reported a record year! Seemingly, if contributions by alumni and winning
athletics teams went hand in hand one would wonder why institutions such as the
University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins, and MIT have managed to maintain enviable
financial solvency without the need to field "big time" programs? In
contrast to the athletic success - alumni giving notion, others have argued
that most donations are made to the general operating budget, to support
specific academic programs, or to enhance an endowment, not to finance sports.
Sperber (1990) makes the important
distinction between persons who graduated from an institution (i. e., alumni),
and those individuals who may have no affiliation with a school other than as
contributors and supporters of its athletic programs (i. e., boosters). He
claims that alumni are not particularly supportive of athletic departments, and
rarely do more than 1 to 2 percent of them actually contribute money to its
teams. Alumni, in general, prefer to give gifts to support academic programs.
In fact, Sperber asserts that many alumni may actually be hostile to athletic
programs. On the other hand, boosters seldom give money to an institution for
academics. Seemingly, these group distinctions are important since athletic
success may be related to the amount of money donated by boosters which goes
directly to athletic programs, rather than to a university's general fund. In
contrast, alumni donations typically support the academic mission of an institution,
and are relatively unaffected by its athletic fortunes. The bottom line here
would be that winning and loosing may only be related to the amount of money
contributed by boosters to athletics, and that the general increment in giving
alleged to result from athletic success is more fiction than fact.
Even at major Division I institutions
the relationship between athletic success and development is less than clear.
On the one hand there are people like John Moore and his wife who gave the
University of Houston $29 million for an athletics complex in 1991, but then
there are also people like Richard Conklin, an official at Notre Dame, who
claimed that there was no relationship between athletic success and giving
(Lederman, 1988). Vice president for development at the University of Southern
California, Roger Olson, also corroborated this view in stating that fund
raising efforts would be unaffected by whether or not athletics teams were
successful. He went on to say, "The simple fact is that the person who wants
to come in and give $8 million to build a new laboratory for our neuroscience
research program is really interested in cutting-edge research" (Lederman,
1988). By the same token, according to a University of Maryland development
official, persons who donate to the athletic department seldom make
contributions to academic programs (Bergmann, 1991).
These observations are supported by a
number of empirical studies which have found no relationship between alumni
donations and dropping of football in 151 schools during the period 1939 to
1974 (Hanford, 1974), or in whether or not football and basketball teams (79
schools were examined) had winning records (Budig, 1976; Sigelman and Carter,
1979). Gaski and Etzel (1987) came to the same conclusion in their study of 99
Division I institutions during the period 1970 through 1979. These studies
would seem to be supported by Frey (1981) who polled a random sample of alumni
from Washington State University. He asked their opinions on how university
expenditures should be prioritized. Results showed that academic programs and
assistance to students ranked much higher than athletics. In another question
respondents were asked to recall their "most remembered" experiences
in school. Only 2.9% of alumni mentioned athletics. If Frey’s sample can be
generalized to alumni in general, one might conclude that they are not as
eager, as some might contend, to build and support athletic programs.
Interestingly, in Frey’s study, alumni leaders were also polled, and found to
be somewhat more predisposed to supporting athletics than the general body of
alumni. He hypothesized that the notion that alumni are eager to support
athletics may stem from the alumni leader-athletic director-coach coalition,
rather than from the real opinions of rank and file alumni.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that
suggests that contributions to an institution are dependent on athletic
success. For example. Sigelman and Bookheimer (1983) found a significant
correlation between athletic contributions and football success, but no
relationship between football success and contributions to the university's
general fund in "big time" programs. Additionally, Coughlin and
Erekson (1985) found that success in football, football attendance, bowl
participation, and basketball winning percentage were directly related to
donations. However, the money coming in again was designated for athletics, not
academics. Interestingly, they found no relationship between athletic donations
and an institution’s academic quality, whether it was private or public, and
the number of sports offered.
Brooker and Klastorin (1981) also found
a relationship between winning football games and alumni donations in the Big
10. Specifically, they reported that the number of alumni who gave to a
university and their average donation increased with the institution's football
fortunes. They also found this to be true in the Ivy League. On the other hand,
they found no relationship between athletic success and giving in schools not
affiliated with conferences, smaller public universities, and those that
focused on basketball. These authors also cautioned that the relationship of
athletic success with alumni giving was very situationally specific, chancy,
and transient. Consequently, they concluded that "Colleges and
universities would be well advised to develop well-rounded programs for
solicitation and for creating alumni support and loyalty through other methods
to prepare for the eventual losing year in athletics" (p. 750).
Nevertheless, a study by the NCAA in
1989 (Raiborn, 1990) found that contributions from alumni and others made up,
on average, 15%, 11%, and 10% of Division I-A, I-AA, and I-AAA athletics'
operating budgets respectively. In the report, it was conveyed that this
percentage had only been about 5% in 1965. While giving appears to be on the
rise, the increasing support of athletic budgets by persons not formally part
of an institution seemingly could be problematic, since their interests and
that of a college’s administration may differ regarding program philosophy and
management. Certainly, with a variety of income streams an athletic director
could be placed in a position of having to serve several bosses. As well, some
institutions have allowed booster organizations to endow or supplement coaches
compensation packages which also can have consequences for the direction taken
by a program.
Furthermore, funds from external sources, including those from
boosters, have tended to create compensation packages which clearly place
coaches in prominent revenue producing sports in a different category than
those in professorial or administrative positions. For example, a poll taken of
salaries of coaches at 87 universities competing in major conferences found
that for 1996-97 the median compensation package for male basketball coaches
was $290,000, and for football coaches it was $268,000 (Naughton,
1997). For the same year the average salary for a professor at institutions
offering doctoral degrees was $76,326 (Chronicle of Higher Education, 1998c).
Indeed, the chief executive officer of institutions offering doctoral degrees
made an average of $174,638 during 1996-97. While it is true that the coaches
compensation is not strictly salary (e.g., TV and radio shows, cars, camps,
etc.), it does represent a strange disparity between those persons having a
responsibility for an institutions central academic focus (i.e., chief
executives and professors), and those responsible for one of its extracurricular
programs. Interestingly, Savage et al. (1929) found in a survey of over 100
colleges seventy year ago the average salary for an academic dean was $6409,
the average for a professor $5148, and the average for a head football coach
$6107. Seemingly, the balance has shifted!
Consequently, it appears that the
benefit from having a winning team is localized to the institution and athletic
program examined. As conveyed, when an increase in donations do relate to
athletic success, this may actually interfere with potential gifts going to
other programs. However, alternative interpretations are possible. Seemingly,
one could also argue that an increase in funds designated for athletics means
that the institution’s general operating budget will be less pressured to
offset athletic deficits, and can consequently be used more fully to support
programs for which it was intended. At the very least, from circumstantial
evidence and the few studies that have examined this issue, there is no really
strong support for the belief that winning in ‘big time" college sports
results in a substantial increase in alumni giving. As with the many variables
discussed, it really depends on the unique situation being examined.
Addendum
In a report recently released by the NCAA Litan, Orszag, & Orszag (2003) concluded that:
Between 1993 and 2001 in Division I-A, every dollar increase in spending on football and basketball brought only a dollar in added revenue.
Increased spending on other sports brought diminishing returns: roughly 25 cents in additional revenue for every additional dollar spent.
Spending changes had no impact on win-loss records. Or on alumni donations. Or on the academic quality of incoming students (based on SAT scores and the percentage of applicants accepted), an indicator of school stature and appeal. Expanded athletic programs appear to be neither the road to riches nor the road to financial ruin."
Spending
increases in football and basketball by one or more members of a conference did
not bring significant increases by other member schools.
Athletics
operating expenses in I-A rose 62% from 1996-97 to 2000-01 ($1.454 billion to
$2.357 billion), compared with a 39% rise in total school spending. Mean football
expenditures (adjusted to 1996 numbers) were fairly stable from 1993 to 1997
but rose 43% from 1997 to 2001 (from $4.2 million to $6 million). Basketball
showed a similar climb, with mean expenditures rising 9% from 1993 to 1997,
then 50% in the next four years (from $1.2 million to $1.8 million).
Contrary
to popular perception, football spending has increased less rapidly than
overall athletics spending in I-A since 1985 (without considering coaches'
outside income and capital expenditures). The biggest spending jumps were in
women's sports. Spending on men's sports other than football and basketball
decreased.
Nearly
two-thirds of all I-A football programs showed a profit in 2001, and the sport
— by far — produced the most revenue (a median of $1.7 million).
Schools
already investing the most in football, ranking in the top 10% in expenses,
stepped up their spending the most (by 46% from 1993 to 2001). The bottom
quarter of I-A, based on spending, increased expenditures by a more modest 23%.
The trend was similar in basketball. There's also a huge disparity in football
profits, with programs in the top 10% averaging $13.3 million in net revenue in
2000-01 and the bottom quarter losing an average of $1 million.
Two
of every five I-A athletics programs said they operated in the black in 2001.
But if state and school subsidies are removed, only 6% operated in the black.
Athletics
expenses are a relatively small share of overall spending by schools in NCAA
Division I-A, accounting for roughly 3.5% of all expenditures in 2001 (up from
a 3% share in 1997)
Schools
in the Western Athletic Conference devoted the largest share of overall
spending to athletics (6.2%) in 2000-01. Big Ten schools, with an average
enrollment of more than 36,000 outside of Northwestern, devoted the smallest
share (1.9%). The rest of I-A, from top to bottom: Conference USA (4.9%), Big
12 (4.8%), Southeastern Conference (4.5%), Mountain West (3.8%), Sun Belt
(3.5%), Atlantic Coast Conference (3.4%), Big East (3.4%), Mid-American (3.2%)
and Pacific-10 (2.6%).
A
caveat for interpreting athletic finances is that capital expenses are not
included in this analysis, and as conveyed by Ohio State athletic director,
Andy Geiger (NCAA.Org, 2003, Aug. 22): "The dynamic in our business is
with facilities. That's where the arms race is." Geiger goes on to point
out that Ohio State is in the process of renovating its 80 year old football
stadium that will cost $197 million! Nonetheless, he also conveys that
amortized over 30 years, this reduces to an annual cost of only $14 million! He anticipates that additional revenue
will offset this increment. But, of course, this presupposes that Ohio State
has a successful team to attract both T.V. revenue and people willing to pay
higher ticket costs.
Finally, to provide some perspective on all of these numbers, Wieberg (2003, Table 5) articulated the various elements composing a D I-A, athletics’ budget while comparing average figures to the University of Florida which has one of the largest programs in the nation. Seemingly, although athletics is a relatively small percentage of an institution’s operating budget, costs are not trivial.
Another
interesting comparison is to compare average costs at a D I university with
average costs at a D III institution. Fulks
(2002b) provides data showing that, on average, overall program costs for a
D III program in 2001 was $1,248,000 in contrast to a D IA program which was
@22,719,000. Seemingly, there are very dramatic differences of what goes on
across divisions, but a critical question that typically is not addressed
concerns the effect athletic participation has on the athletes engaged, and
whether the additional costs, and all that goes with this at D I is worth the
difference in expenditures? From an educational perspective, and the major
justification for having athletic programs as part of the extra-curriculum, the
answer to this question is of paramount importance.
Reforming the System
From its inception, intercollegiate
athletics have been controversial. Indeed, even in its infancy during the
period 1852 to 1860, the Yale Faculty felt that crew competition with Harvard
was so disruptive to students that they banned future competitions (Lucas,
& Smith 1978). As well, the creation of the NCAA itself during the period
1905 to 1910 was a response to injuries and deaths resulting from football.
Perhaps the most comprehensive and influential examination of intercollegiates
during the first half of the century came from the Carnegie Foundation (Savage
et al., 1929). In this document commercialization and professionalization of
college sports was lamented, as were the many abuses that continue to this day
including, recruiting irregularities, time conflict between academics and athletics,
the limited number of participants who actually participate, and negative
booster involvement. More recently we have had the Knight Commission (Knight
Commission, 1991) which stated that the problems in intercollegiate athletics
were so serious and systemic that re-thinking of the fundamental premises upon
which college sports were based was necessary.
Perhaps one of the most remarkable
criticisms of big time college sports come from Walter Byers (1995), NCAA
executive director from 1951 to 1987. Byers ruled this organization during the
period when the NCAA grew into a multi-million dollar operation, and expanded
its control over an increasing number of sports, including those programs
organized and run by women. In his book, Byers argues against the plantation
system of cultivating and controlling athletes that evolved during his watch.
He even goes so far as to say that athletes should be paid a reasonable wage
for the money they generate in high profile football and basketball programs.
In a speech given prior to the release of his book, Byers stated that: ''The
coach owns the athlete's feet, the college owns the athlete's body, and the
athlete's mind is supposed to comprehend a rule book that I challenge..."
(McCallum and Obrien, 1994). Byers also claims that the NCAA uses the notions
of "amateurism" and "level playing field" as a diversion to
distribute money in ways that best support a misguided system. The
beneficiaries of college sports, in Byers view, are colleges, coaches and
administrators to a much greater extent than athletes. With these criticism
coming from the ultimate insider, it is indeed perplexing to ponder why after
so many years, with so many commissions, and so many suggestions for reform, so
little has changed?
Certainly, college athletics has had
more than its share of problems and critics. Notwithstanding, it continues to
grow and thrive despite all of its problems. Consequently, the issue today is
one of evolution toward changes that would make it more compatible with the central
mission of higher education. An examination of the philosophy statements from
the various NCAA Division manuals is probably as good a starting point as any
to determine what athletics should contribute to a student-athlete's
development. Common to all divisions is the statement:
The competitive athletics programs of member
institutions are designed to be a vital part of the educational system. A basic
purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of
the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.
Clearly, this is an admirable idea which
varies greatly in operationalization. But, even those who enjoy and support
college athletics would have difficulty agreeing that its intent has been
faithfully realized when considering "big time" football and
basketball programs. The vast sums of money involved, the payment of
extraordinary large salaries to coaches, the extravagant facilities used by
only a few, the intensity of recruiting athletes that are sometimes only
marginal or below marginal students, the travel required during school time,
the long hours athletes devote to sport relative to academics, and the
television and media exposure all work to create a system that not only
separates sports from other programs at an institution, but also to separate
athletes from their student peers. In regard to fulfilling the objectives presented
in the NCAA’s statement, one would have to conclude that many colleges and
universities do not take it seriously, or are deluding themselves into
believing that their programs are in accordance with its intent. Simply stated,
too much history exists to flatly accept the phrase "...a clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports"
exists. When the NCAA is being paid $1.75 billion dollars by CBS to broadcast
its men’s basketball championship, and major football conferences are
realigning themselves to better realize the hundreds of millions of dollars up
for grabs from broadcasting rights (Barnhart, 1998), it is difficult to
understand how amateurism and commercialism can co-exist.
Indeed, the NCAA has recently renegotiated
its contract with CBS to broadcast the Men's Division 1 basketball
championships, and now calls for $6 billion over 11 years (NCAA News, 1999). This results in an average payout of
$545 million a year, which is over a 100% increment over the average $216
million it receives in its present $1.75 billion deal. Table 4 below shows the
increasing trend in income provided to the NCAA by its television revenue from
this tournament. Obviously, the amount of money involved in broadcasting a very
commercial product, increases the difficulty of separating amateur and
professional sports, despite the NCAA's intentions.
Table 4. Television revenue of NCAA 1981
-1999
|
Year |
Total Deal |
Average Yearly Payout |
|
1981 |
$48 million |
$48 million |
|
1985 |
$55.3 million |
$55.3 million |
|
1988 |
$166 million |
$166 million |
|
1991 |
$1 billion/7 years |
$143 million |
|
1995 |
$1.725 billion/8 years |
$216 million |
|
1999 |
$6 billion/11 years |
$545 million |
Over the years a plethora of suggestions
for reforming big-time intercollegiate athletics have been proposed. These have
run the gamut from abolishing them all-together to "tweaking" the
system when a particular problem arises.
Abolishing Intercollegiates. The
idea of abolishing intercollegiate athletics has been around for many years.
When the Yale Faculty banned competition against Harvard after several regattas
during the 1850s it was, in essence, showing its wrath toward the disruptive
affects that athletic competition was having on its students. When Chancellor
of New York University, Henry McCracken called for a national meeting in 1905
to either transform or abolish collegiate football, because of brutality and
death on the field, he was questioning whether such an activity had a place in
academia (Lucas and Smith, 1978). When President of the University of Chicago,
Robert Hutchins decided to discard its football program in 1929, he was unable
to reconcile the rift between intellectual development and mass entertainment
(Lawson and Ingham, 1980). When CCNY decided to back away from big-time
basketball after its scandalous 1950-1951 season, it too was having difficulty
justifying its importance as an adjunct to promoting academic excellence.
Indeed, these examples, and many others that could be conveyed, have the basic
theme that big-time intercollegiates are more of a liability than an asset to
colleges, and that their elimination may be warranted.
More recently, Hochfield
(1987), in response to his university deciding to go from Division III to
Division I, argues that athletic excellence and academic excellence are
incompatible. He states:
The plain, irreducible truth is that there is no
rational connection between higher education and professional sports, and
universities ought to do other things than field football and basketball teams
as ways of distinguishing themselves (p. 40).
He goes on to debunk all the stereotypical
arguments for why such programs are good for a campus (e.g., publicity, school
spirit, income, etc.), and then declares: "The plain realities are that
the athletes must pretend to be students, and the universities must pretend to
be interested in their education" (p. 41). For him, and others, academia
is primarily about conveying "... the best, most truthful, most
interesting and important culture that mankind possesses from one generation to
the next" (p. 43). Any activities which interfere with this process does
not belong, and, according to him, "big-time" athletics is such an
activity.
For the most part, while such arguments
appear compelling, few institutions have opted to eliminate their
"big-time" programs, although several have taken this step. For
example, Tulane dropped its basketball program in 1985 because of a scandal,
yet in 1986 donations rose by $5 million dollars. Similarly, Wicthita State
University dropped is dept ridden football program, and despite warnings that
alumni support would diminish, donations nearly doubled in a short time period,
as did enrollments (Lederman, 1988). When Father William Sullivan, President of
Seattle University, with the support of trustees and faculty eliminated its
Division I basketball program in favor of NAIA to save money in 1980, critics
warned of dire consequences. However, by 1986 Deford (1986) reported that
alumni giving had actually increased every year since the program was
de-emphasized. As well, student enrollments had increased by 15%. Money
previously used for athletic scholarships was reallocated for academic awards,
and the intramural program was expanded. Father Sullivan concluded from the
experience:
… its clear that with a few exceptions, alumni
support their university because of their education and not because of the fact
that for a few times during the course of their undergraduate years they sat in
the bleachers and watched somebody else dribble up and down the court or run
across a field" (p. 70).
Notwithstanding these isolated cases,
the pressures to maintain national visibility in athletics is increasing, as
evidenced by realignments in football conferences that are taking place for the
purpose of presenting a more desirable television package to broadcasters. As
well, the belief in its publicity and entertainment value in attracting
students, in cultivating alumni and community support, and in generating income
to pay for non-revenue producing sports continues. Despite the difficulty of
refuting arguments related to the incompatibility of athletics and academics,
reform by abolition is not really viable in today’s climate.
De-emphasizing. A less severe
approach to reform would be that of de-emphasizing professionalized programs
and making them more like those found in Division III. For example, if one were
to compare Division I-A and Division III NESCAC schools they would find that
the latter award no athletic scholarships, have significantly shorter seasons,
demand less practice time of their athletes each week, spend less on facilities
and equipment, do not fire competent coaches because of their won-loss records,
and generate virtually no income (Looney, 1994). As well, although some
recruiting is done, many students who are not recruited can often participate
on a team as a "walk-on." In fact, as conveyed by Underwood (1975),
at Division III schools like MIT maximum participation is the goal, and no one
really cares whether spectators show up for an event. This is not to say that
athletes in such programs do not care about winning, they do. But they also
care about balance, and everyone agrees that the reason why students should be
in college is first, and foremost, to get an education.
A school which has successfully moved
from Division I to Division III in recent years is Hardin-Simmons College in
West-Texas (Blum, 1994). The decision was based on the desire to bring back its
football program, which it was unable to afford at a Division I level. At the
time the move was made, there were a number of disgruntled athletes and coaches
who wished to continue in Division I, but as they left and were replaced by new
athletes, coaches, and a president with a different mind set, the transition
appeared to be a success. Indeed, Blum gives the view of Jim Jennings , a
former football player from Hardin-Simmons who graduated in 1932, and has
remained a season’s ticket holder for basketball, and now attends their home
football games: "Basketball is basketball. Football is football. It's
exciting if it's your team, and it's exciting if the game is competitive. We
don't need to be in any certain division to have a good time" (A35). While
spectator entertainment is no longer a necessity for Hardin-Simmons, this
comment seems to suggest that Division III competition can be every bit as exhilarating
as that found in Division I. However, schools can focus on their primary
mission of educating students and promoting scholarship, rather than having to
operate a professional sports program which may undermine its integrity.
Despite the rationality of such an
approach it is unlikely that many schools are interested in moving into
Division III from Divisions I or II. Indeed, as conveyed by Blum (1994), since
1981 three institutions moved from Division I to Division III, while 40 entered
Division I, with many others interested in moving up. As with such endeavors,
the trend appears to be "up" rather than down, mediated by the belief
that somehow an institution that does so will be able to escape from obscurity
and share in all the alleged benefits of the "big-time" without
enduring its many disadvantages.
Unfortunately, the reality is that
breaking into Division I, and being an instant success is not very probable.
Conferences have been picking and choosing among its strongest members, and
have virtually shut the door to weaker programs, which invariably newer ones
will be (Selingo, 1997). As well, recruiting athletes for such programs
seemingly will be more difficult, with the better ones wishing to attend more
high profile institutions who have already established themselves as evidenced
by their national stature, facilities, and media deals. Consequently, while the
virtues of Division III have been espoused by those who are there, and many
critics of "big-time" college sports, it is more than likely that a
move towards de-emphasis will not be popular, and certainly not be part of a
major reform movement in college athletics.
Better Faculty and Presidential
Control. Since the 19th century there have been numerous calls for tighter
control over athletics, but because it was a student run endeavor from its
inception, the issue of who should take the lead has been equivocal. As Chu
(1989) points out the first attempt at control was to fold intercollegiates
into physical education, with faculty from this department given the
responsibility for the "athletics curriculum." However, as pointed
out by the Carnegie Commission Report in 1929 (Savage et al., 1929), this
effort to take control of athletics was quite suspect, as their data showed
that of 177 directors of departments which encompassed physical education and
athletics only 23 had actually majored in physical education, and 85% claimed
that their stature as football coaches was primarily responsible for themselves
being hired. Consequently, it appeared that instead of real faculty control of
athletics, coaches were simply given faculty appointments in order to quell
calls for greater faculty oversight.
More recently, Sperber
(1991) suggests that because various attempts at reforming intercollegiate
athletics have failed, the best last hope still lies with college faculties,
but with a variation from previous themes. He argues that faculty athletic
committees, as constituted by the NCAA, could conceivably oversee and control
what athletic departments do if they wished to take the initiative. This would
mean that such committees would be selected by faculty councils or senates
rather than by administrative appointment. Their mission would be to examine
the financial books of a department, as well as assess and regulate admission’s
policy and practices in order to guarantee academic integrity. Of course,
members of such an enterprise would be required to maintain their own integrity
by refraining from accepting perks typically offered to faculty
representatives, such as game tickets and trips to post season championships,
that characterize the status quo, and compromise many current oversight
committees.
While suggestions for greater faculty
control have always seemed reasonable in theory, they have stood little chance
of success in practice. Faculties, with or without an NCAA mandate, have always
had the choice of playing a greater role in overseeing athletics, but have
rarely exercised the option. Even if a particularly inspired faculty, in one or
two institutions decided to do so, it is unlikely that faculties across the
nation would be likely to follow suit. One basic problem is that faculty are
primarily focused and rewarded for their scholarship and teaching, not
providing institutional service or reforming and governing extracurricular
activities (e.g., Williams, et al., 1987). As well, faculty also normally work
within a highly departmentalized environment in which a major concern is
maintaining, or increasing one’s own turf by building alliances, not
antagonizing other constituencies. Favorable relations with the administration,
other departments, trustees, and the community are worth cultivating.
Seemingly, real faculty reformers would need to be willing to sacrifice
personal rewards by spending inordinate amounts of their time and energy
battling the athletic behemoth. This is not to say that faculty are not the
appropriate body to take the lead, as the idea seems to emerge periodically,
but that the possibility of faculty rising up to reign in athletics is not a
likely scenario in the near future. The rewards for such action are small in
relation to potential grief that may accrue to those wishing to upset the
system.
If faculty have not come to the fore to
reform intercollegiates, the idea that presidents should take charge has been
proposed many times over the years. Indeed, it was the presidents who first
embraced intercollegiates in their earlier days because they saw its potential
as a medium to advertise their institution, attract students, and gain alumni
support. The example of President John Swain of Swarthmore, at the turn of the
century, imposing a football program on his campus because he believed it
enhanced institutional well-being, despite faculty resistance, illustrates how
a president can assert his will (Clark, 1970). The power of the president was
also demonstrated by Robert Hutchins at the University of Chicago who was
instrumental in dismantling a popular "big-time" program, because he
did not think that it was part of the institutions mission. Of course when
Hutchins did this Chicago was thriving, and he could afford to be somewhat
cavalier, where other schools were still struggling to stay afloat.
Nonetheless, these examples illustrate how presidential power can be asserted
despite resistance to change coming from a number of factions.
The notion of presidential control seems
reasonable in light of their institutional role and position vis à vis faculty
and other constituencies. Most recently, this notion was proposed by the Knight
Commission (1991) which recommended that presidents should take over control of
their own athletics programs, conferences in which they compete, and the NCAA.
The Commission also stated that trustees and regents should stop being a
roadblock to presidents and let them pursue reform. Interestingly, this
recommendation followed a decade during which the presidents did attempt to
take over control of the NCAA, but failed. Sperber (1990) points out that the
American Council on Education in 1979, like many groups before them, called for
major reforms in college athletics, and ultimately recommended that a
President’s Board oversee the NCAA with the authority to veto or modify NCAA
rules, and to create additional rules, subject to approval by presidents of all
NCAA institutions.
The idea for such a dramatic change was
to wrestle control of athletics out of the hands of athletic directors,
coaches, and sympathetic faculty representatives in order to bring "...
athletics in line with the educational missions of their schools"
(Sperber, 1990, p. 333). But, such a change was not to be, as the President of
the NCAA claimed that such a group would not really reflect the will of its
members, which is more accurately expressed through its own executive board made
up of forty-six members which include, athletic directors, coaches, faculty
representatives, and college presidents. Instead of getting the powerful
president’s board, a President’s Commission was approved which had only
"advisory powers." While this group has had good intentions, and many
worthy ideas such as shortening seasons, reducing the number of athletic
scholarships, and shortening the athletic "work week" , it has not
been able to significantly impact the "big business" model of
Division I programs.
That presidents were unable to take
control of the NCAA, perhaps, reflects how times have changed, as have the
roles and powers of the president. In fact, as pointed out by (Jacobson, 1984),
the position of college president seems to be in trouble because of the
diversity of responsibilities encompassed by the job. Cole (1985) points out
that the modern day college president is expected to be institutional
visionary, image builder, fund raiser, financial manager, head of
administration, problem mediator, marketing executive, faculty advocate,
academic planner, student mentor, ceremonial official, moral guide, government
liaison, trustee advisor and community leader. Birnbaum (1992) further conveys
that because the president’s role is so diverse and demanding, it is essential
that he or she build support from various constituencies. This requires great
finesse and talent in engaging and convincing factions about the merits of
moving in a particular direction, rather than imposing completed plans from the
top. With such diverse roles, and so many people to satisfy, the present day
president is only a distant relation to his historical counterpart. Indeed,
responsibilities have grown, but direct power has waned. It is not surprising
that few people are very successful in fulfilling the demands of the position,
or remain in office for more than just a few years.
Consequently, the modern day president
finds himself spread thinly over a vast empire, with athletics being only one
of a large number of programs, or problems requiring attention. As well, it is
generally perceived as one of those areas that normally is not of central
concern to a chief executive. Yet, it is an area that is often deeply charged
with emotion, and one which can get a college president into deep trouble if he
or she attempts to take control and tamper with the system. While the position
of president may connote vast powers, great resources, and the capacity to
effect change, it really appears to have become more about managing, rather than
leading.
Perhaps, a case which illustrates a
presidents inability to really make a difference in athletics is that of
William Atchley, a former president of Clemson University (Monaghan, 1985).
While Clemson had won the national championship in football in 1981, it also
had been sanctioned by the NCAA in men’s basketball (1975-1978) and football
(1982-1984) for a variety of violations. Subsequently, it was reported that
some athletes were involved with illicit drugs, and that alumni, who had
donated $5 million annually to athletics, were also giving money to players
"under the table". Recruiting violations were also involved. Atchley,
in an effort to clean-up the mess, asked trustees for their support. They
refused and, instead, forced him to resign!
Given the complexity of the position,
and the deeply entrenched athletic establishment, it is no wonder that
presidents have backed away from making major changes in college sports.
Essentially, they have tweaked the system, but have not put their jobs on the line
to do what critics throughout the years have consistently said needed to be
done. Commercialism remains rampant, budgets are in the red, TV determines
schedules, travel is extensive, winning is critical for generating spectator
interest, recruiting is essential for winning, and coaches are the highest paid
employees on campus . And, as always, questions remain about whether or not
athletes are students first and athletes second, or just athletes. Even
legendary coach Bear Bryant thought the enterprise hypocritical when he stated:
I used to go along with the idea that football
players on scholarship were ‘student-athletes,’ which is what the NCAA calls
them. Meaning a student first, an athlete second. We were kidding ourselves,
trying to make it more palatable to the academicians. We don’t have to say that
and we shouldn’t. At the level we play, the boy is really an athlete first and
a student second. (Michener, 1976, p. 254).
The Professional Model. So if the
NCAA, faculty and college presidents are unlikely to make systemic reforms in
"big-time" college sports, and it is unlikely that they will be
abolished or de-emphasized any time soon, what other alternatives are there?
Must we simply learn to live with them, and accept the normal procession of
rules violations and roguish behavior, all in the quest to win games, fill
stadiums, and bring "honor and prestige" to the university? Or is it
time to admit that attempting to fit a square peg in a round hole will just not
work, and consider more unique approaches to solving the athletic-academic
puzzle?
Perhaps the most novel, but
controversial idea is simply to acknowledge the professional and commercial
nature of intercollegiate athletics and develop a system to regulate it.
Michener (1976) made such a suggestion arguing for a four division model in
which the first division would consist of the super powers of college sports.
These institutions would consist of the high profile football and basketball
schools that wish to play against the most competitive programs in the country.
Athletes in such programs would not be required to be students unless they were
qualified and interested in doing so. They would be paid in relation to market
rates. In Michener’s proposal, schools in the second division would be those
presently in Division I, but unable to keep up with the superpowers. Here he
proposes that athletes would continue to receive athletic scholarships, but
they would only be permitted to take one course while in season, so that they
would be able to do justice to their academic work, while rightfully placing
athletics as their top priority. He suggests that athletes in this division
could take a full academic load in the off season, and attend summer school in
order to graduate on time, or in a five year time period.
While the specifics of this proposal are
somewhat sketchy, conceptually it is a dramatic paradigm change from the past
150 years. It acknowledges, as Bear Bryant pointed out, that individuals in
"big time" programs are athletes first and students second, rather
than the reverse. While the notion of "student-athlete" has been a
worthy ideal, the reality of putting in 40 to 60 hours a week practicing,
working-out, traveling and competing has confirmed that the student part of the
equation needs revamping. Dropping the requirement for athletes to be students
in the first division would also eliminate the need to satisfy ridiculously low
standards for individuals to qualify for scholarships, as decreed by
Propositions 48 and 42. As well schools would not be pressured into accepting
persons who were ill prepared to do college work. The athletic department would
simply sign individuals as athletes. If these persons were able and interested
in taking courses and pursuing a degree, that would be their option.
Presumably, individuals interested in athletics in the second division would
also be interested in pursing academic work, since if they were only interested
in being athletes they could opt for the first division. As well, the reduction
in course work during a season would help foster quality in academics since it
acknowledges the importance of attending to different activities at different
times of the year, rather than living in a state of constant overload.
The idea that big-time college
athletices should be paid was recently discussed at a forum held at the St.
John’s University Law School (Steven, 1998). A panel
made up of lawyers and former professional athletes unanimously agreed that
college athletes should be paid in addition to receiving a scholarship.
Scott-McLaughlin, moderator, and a professor at Pace University Law School
argued that times have changed, and that Olympic athletes are now getting
endorsements, being paid, and no longer need be amateurs. Why should college
athletes be any different? As well, a study by Brown (1991) concluded that the
NCAA "cartel", operationalized through Division I-A football programs
and guidelines for athletic grants in aid, has prevented many of the best
players from being paid according to their real economic value by as much as
$500,000 per season! While questions remain about who should be paid, and how
much they should get, critics have become increasing vocal regarding the
disparity between player "salaries", and those given to others, such
as coaches, who often have seven figure compensation packages.
Interestingly, where the NCAA and
colleges have been reluctant to accept the idea of paying athletes, private
entrepreneurs are attempting to fill the gap (Krupa, 1998). For men’s
basketball it has been observed that players today have few options. According
to agent Andrew Brandt, "If you are a young male basketball player in this
country who seeks to play at the professional level, you have access either to
a league where the average pay is $ 2.4 million or another league where the
average pay is $15,000 and there is no in between" (Krupa,
1998, p. C1). Consequently three new leagues are being proposed, the
Collegiate Professional Basketball League, The National Rookie League, and the
International Basketball League. The idea upon which these leagues are being
formulated is that many talented high school basketball players are not ready
for playing in the NBA, ineligible academically to participate in college, not
interested in pursuing academics, or unable financially to participate on the
college level, and would prefer to simply make a living playing basketball.
Consequently, like baseball, these leagues would become a farm system for the
NBA, instead of using colleges, with all of their restrictions, to cultivate
talent. Interestingly, each league intends to offer some money for a college
education when, and if, players are ready to pursue such. As well, leagues plan
to offer training for life as a professional athlete. Richard Lapchick,
Director of the Center for the Study of Sports in Society at Northeastern
University has agreed to direct the player education component for the
International Basketball League.
Perhaps the most interesting of the
three startup leagues is the Collegiate Professional Basketball League,
conception of Babson College accounting professor Paul McMann (Veverka, 1998). Recognizing the hypocrisy of
"big-time" programs which includes coaches making large sums of money
that only trickles down to players in the form of scholarships, and players
inability to concentrate on academics and graduate, McMann has created a unique
system for resolving these issues. His idea is to recruit college eligible
players, pay them $9000 a year and give them a signing bonus of $5000. Players
would also receive free tuition, room, and board for eight years, rather than
4. Furthermore, they would be required to attend a minimum of eight weeks of
classes during the off season at the University of Maryland Eastern Shores. In
addition, if a player wished to attend a trade school, or another university in
addition to Maryland Eastern Shores, the league would pay for this. As well,
players who earn a degree in four years would get a $10,000 bonus, and those
who receive a degree in less than eight years would receive $2,500. While the
league still has a way to go in securing corporate sponsorship, it provides a
very interesting model for radical reform in "big-time" college
athletics. Rather than trying to change the system from within, it by-passes
years of entrenchment and hypocrisy in the NCAA, and provides a model for how
athletics and academics can work in concert.
In reality, it is unlikely that any of
these efforts will succeed because of the need to secure financing from
skeptical lenders, the long standing identification that people have with their
favorite universities, and the large sums of money already invested in college
sports by the media and corporate sponsors. But, the concept of making the roll
of student-athlete more realistic by extending the duration during which they
may pursue academic work, and increasing the financial support to do so, are
likely to be topics of discussion within NCAA circles, as outside competition
for players increase.
What would such a plan accomplish if
adapted for institutions presently engaged in "big-time" sports?
First, it would eliminate the chronic conflict between athletics and academics.
Individuals could give their full attention to each. With four years of
athletic eligibility and eight years of scholarship aid there would be ample
time for participants to focus on both areas. Second, athletes in such programs
would be permitted to earn a descent income for their participation, something
that coaches and universities already do. Indeed, the argument that athletes
receive a scholarship, and that this is ample reward for their involvement may
be compelling in programs which operate on the financial margin, but not in
programs where universities and coaches earn millions from what their athletes
do on the fields and in the gymnasiums. Presumably, being paid to play would
also dissuade athletes from taking money under the table, or becoming involved
in other illegal or unethical activities. Third, financial incentives for
graduating within a specified period would surely be more reinforcing in
producing serious academic accomplishment than verbal encouragement emphasizing
the importance of a degree in life after sports. Seemingly this message has
been around for many years, but has not been taken seriously by thousands who
have little to show for four years of attending college. Finally, such a plan
would help eliminate the hypocrisy of trying to run a professional athletics’
program within an amateur framework. Athletes, like their coaches, and Olympic
counterparts, would be permitted to endorse products, or earn income in any
other legal endeavor. As well, such athletic programs would not draw financial
resources away from other areas of the university to offset deficits, since
programs would need to be self-sustaining. As well, NCAA rules could be vastly
reduced since athletes would become employees of institutions, rather than a
special class of student, requiring extraordinary monitoring and guidance.
As with most ideas which relate to
professionalizing college athletics, a number of lingering questions must be
addressed, especially if the NCAA were to agree to a plan. One which needs to
be resolved is how many athletes and teams would be included in the scheme. As
already indicated, most colleges involved in Division I already lose money, so
adding the additional expense of paying athletes could conceivably send budgets
even deeper into the red. But in examining the data for football and men’s
basketball powerhouse schools, such as those represented in the ACC, one
concludes that surpluses for these programs actually do exist and could be used
to pay players. However, these surpluses are typically transferred to support
other sports which run at a deficit. Consequently, a decision would need to be
made regarding whether to continue supporting such programs using another
source of funding, eliminating them, or decreasing their expenses. In essence,
there is no reason, other than the current NCAA mandate requiring a minimal
number of sports and scholarships in Division I, that so called "minor
sports" could not be changed to reflect more of a Division III model.
Hence, expenses for scholarships, travel, coaching, and facilities could be
significantly reduced and folded into a university’s operating budget. As well,
with a less high powered approach to so-called "minor sports" more
students might have an opportunity to tryout for teams, which presently, are
already determined by recruiting. Hence, time involvement could be reduced, and
athletes in such programs would more likely reflect the general student
population, a basic desideratum of the present NCAA philosophy.
A second issue would relate to whether
or not "professionalized" college athletes would be required to be
students. Michener’s proposal for his highest division has no such requirement.
However, this is probably too radical an idea to be widely embraced today. In
contrast, McMann’s plan for balancing academics with athletics over the course
of a year and extending the period over which scholarship aid is awarded,
rather than requiring individuals to engage in athletics and academics
simultaneously, seems to make sense. As well, providing cash incentives for
completing degrees also seems worthy of consideration in light of lower
graduation rates found in many "big-time" programs today. With such
changes, it seems reasonable not to drop the student requirement, which is an
essential ingredient of what a college team is supposed to be.
A third issue which is not effectively
addressed in the professional model is the impact it would have on recruiting,
admissions, and matriculation. Presumably, recruiting would continue to be
intense, but it is unclear what impact would befall admissions. Would schools
be more or less inclined to take athletes who were ill-prepared to do college
work? As well, would there be a rule which required satisfactory progress
through a degree program? Considering that athletes would be supported for
eight years, it is unclear what this would mean, although details could
certainly be worked out. Seemingly, with no academic matriculation requirement
during an athlete’s playing days (i. e., more in line with Michener’s proposal),
admission’s requirements could be significantly reduced (e. g., no need for
such things as Proposition 42), since athlete’s would not become ineligible for
academic reasons, just as other university employees do not lose their jobs if
they decide to take a course, and do poorly. With such a system, some athletes
might even decide to drop -out of school without having taken a course after
playing their four years. But, given the opportunity to earn a degree without
concomitant demands of athletics, and the financial incentives for doing so,
athletes and pundits could no longer accuse institutions of using athletes and
then spiting them out without providing the education promised during the
recruiting process. The athlete would be solely responsible for obtaining or
not obtaining an education.
Finally, a significant problem which
would need addressing is how such a plan would meet Title IX guidelines? From
the data presented on ACC and Mid American schools, no women’s athletic
programs have surplus income. One possibility would be for schools to offer
women resources equivalent to those for combined football and men’s basketball
programs. Seemingly, this would not be an attractive options since it would
eliminate surplus revenue generated from those programs which might already be
allocated for player salaries. A second alternative would be to restrict
professionalized college programs to teams that can generate profits. For the
present this would effectively eliminate women from such involvement, but in a
professional model surplus income is a requirement for survival. This does not
preclude women, if they so desire, in future professionalized involvement, but
it does put an onus on them to generate enough income to support their
expenses. Just as with non-revenue producing men’s teams a full complement of
women’s teams following a Division III model could be offered.
Summary
From this review several things can be
surmised. First, collegiate athletic programs vary across a range from being
entirely student oriented to being professionalized. Typically, this parallels
the divisional classification system of the NCAA with Division III reflecting
more of the former, and Division I more of the latter. For the most part,
Division I issues, especially those related to football and basketball, have
dominated the discussion of collegiate sports because of the large impact they
have on college life, and the numerous problems that have arisen over the
years. From their earliest years administrators believed that large-scale
athletic programs provided not only a recreational outlet for students, but
also an advertising instrument which could benefit admissions and fund raising
efforts. However, with "big-time" sports have come many abuses. These
have included such things as: (a) injuries to players from dangerous
techniques, (b) betting and fixing games, (c) acceptance of individuals into
colleges who did not have the ability and/or interest in obtaining an
education, (d) illegal payments to athletes by boosters, (e) conflict between
time required for athletic involvement and time required for academic work, and
(f) altering transcripts so that academically ineligible athletes could
continue to play. Furthermore, a major consideration in recent times relates to
the vast sums of money involved, and the consequences for making or losing
money. These pressures have added to the professionalization of
"big-time" programs, and moved athletes further away from realizing
the role of student-athlete.
Several ideas were proposed to reform
the system. On one end of the continuum are proposals for abolishing or
de-emphasizing "big-time" sports. This tack, however, seems quite
unrealistic during a period of great interest and program expansion. Another
idea that has been proposed many times over the years is for faculty and
presidents to exert more effective control over athletic organization and
administration. However, this too, although being logical, seems unworkable
because of the politics of collegiate athletics in America. A final idea which
may seem somewhat like caving in to forces already out of control, is to call a
spade a spade, and overtly professional "big-time" programs. While
this option may be anathema to "purists" it simply acknowledges what
already exists, and attempts to create mechanisms to maintain what people seem
to like about such programs, and eliminate that which they do not.
Interestingly, individuals have already begun to create models for such
programs outside of the traditional NCAA paradigm that has been resistant to
challenging the notion of "student-athlete.
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