BACKGROUND
My research revolves around the problems of analytical and computational complexity
in the sciences and how these problems affect our understanding of standard topics in
the philosophy of science. Since scientists often employ approximations to circumvent
complexity, I sometimes describe my research as an examination of the ontology and
epistemology of approximations. I have published essays on questions of method, theory
construction and evaluation, reduction and explanation, and metaphysics. An overarching
theme of my work is that models are sites of interpretive work in the sciences. Models
often have their own ontological commitments, and in comparison to theories,
scientists often use different epistemological standards to assess their adequacy.
In addition, models are often the means by which scientists articulate theory with
experiment. A second theme is the limitation of fundamental theory to solve all the
problems a scientist might be interested in. Despite widespread agreement on the
relevance of a ‘fundamental’ science to a ‘less fundamental’ science, unification at
the level of theories, laws, explanations and disciplines does not necessarily follow.
In my research, I strive to provide philosophically sensitive rationales for why
models are necessary and why fundamentalism, or reductionism, offers an important but
incomplete perspective on many problems in the sciences.
My minor area of research involves an examination of the use of scientific
information in matters of public policy. Model and parameter uncertainties plague our
attempts to understand environmental processes and interactions. Decision making must
be sensitive to gaps in our scientific knowledge.
COURSES
- Thinking about Thinking
- History of Modern Philosophy
- Environmental Ethics
- Colloquium in Applied Ethics: Science, Policy and Society
Selected publications
Coming soon
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